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The IPO is a topic that has been widely examined in literature; research effort within this field 
has been given to main markets, while relatively little attention has been brought to secondary 
markets. In my dissertation thesis, I study the post-listing dynamics of firms going public on 
the AIM Italia, with the aim of assessing whether listing offers benefits to Italian SMEs. To this 
end, I study the performance of AIM-listed firms with respect to that of their non-listed peers, 
detecting if significant differences in corporate performance exist in the post-listing period (t, 
t+1, t+2, t+3). The sample under analysis consists of 33 listed companies and 484 comparable 
firms, whose information is available on AIDA database. By employing the R software, I 
analyse four macro-categories – general characteristics, size and growth, efficiency and 
profitability, financial structure and liquidity – and construct a multiple linear regression. AIM-
listed firms appear to be characterised post-quotation by worse performance indicators with 
respect to non-listed companies. In fact, the IPO decision seems to determine a reduction of 
both ROA and ROI, testifying that a significant decrease in profitability occurs as a result of 
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The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) is a secondary market arranged to satisfy the capital 
needs of smaller companies. It represents an alternative and complementary mode of funding 
to finance firms’ valuable new investments and growth, at a lower cost. Moreover, it is a market 
that is gaining in popularity, and its success is undoubtful; in fact, thanks to its flexible 
regulatory regime, the AIM is attracting a growing number of companies if compared to main 
markets.  
The AIM Italia was founded in December 2008, as an imitation of the AIM UK – one of the 
most popular secondary markets in the world and a source of inspiration for the youngest 
markets dedicated to SMEs. Given the relevance of SMEs within the Italian economy and since 
the listing of SMEs in Italy is a relatively recent and growing phenomenon, the unique and 
interesting setting provided by the AIM Italia is worthy of study. 
 
The Initial Public Offering (IPO) is a topic that has been widely examined in literature because 
it represents a turning point in the life of a company, resulting in radical changes in the whole 
structure of the firm. A variety of perspectives has been adopted by scholars in order to deal 
with this field of study; among these, the IPO’s impact on corporate performance has raised the 
interest of academics. In this regard, some pieces of research have focused their attention on 
the comparison between stock exchanges in different countries, others on the comparison of 
listed and non-public companies, and some other studies have also investigated the post-IPO 
changes at the managerial-ownership level. 
However, it is worth taking notice of the fact that the major research effort within this field has 
been given to main markets. Instead, companies that go public on secondary markets have 
received relatively little attention from the empirical literature. 
 
Thus, it is not easy to find studies involving the effects of listing on the AIM. The reason behind 
the infrequent literature concerning the AIM is linked to the fact that finding data for smaller-
sized companies is generally more problematic, making analyses more complex. To the best of 
my knowledge, no empirical paper focuses on the post-quotation performance of companies 
listed on the AIM Italia. 
Hence, by studying the post-listing dynamics of AIM-listed firms, my dissertation thesis aims 
to bridge this gap in literature. It is necessary to close the existing gap in order to understand 
whether listing on AIM Italia offers benefits to companies. More specifically, it is important to 
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conduct this analysis for all those SMEs that are considering going public, and for those that 
will consider doing so in the future. 
 
My dissertation thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 1 introduces the AIM Italia, by 
presenting the general figures of this secondary market, the listing requirements, the steps and 
subjects involved in the listing process. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the existing literature 
on IPOs, with a particular insight into the post-listing effects on the performance of newly-listed 
companies. Chapter 3 presents my empirical research: the method, the descriptive statistics and 
the statistical analysis. Finally, Chapter 4 reports the results of my study and answers the 






THE ITALIAN ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET 
 
1.1 AIM Italia: a means of financing to support the growth of SMEs 
 
The Italian economy is characterised by a dynamic network of Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises1 (SMEs). The relevance of SMEs within the Italian business landscape is confirmed 
when looking at other European economies; in fact, Italy enjoys the largest pool of SMEs in 
Europe, whose value added is second at European level (Borsa Italiana, 2013). 
The Cerved Report (2019) identifies about 5 million SMEs, of which 130 thousands are small 
and 26 thousands are medium-sized companies. The 99% of Italian businesses are SMEs, which 
employ 82% of workers and create about 70% of the Italian value added. In absolute terms, 
SMEs employ over 15 million people and generate a total turnover of €2,000 billion (Il Sole 24 
ore, 2019). Hence, these numbers testify that SMEs are a salient feature of the Italian economy. 
Within this context, the banking system plays a central role in providing SMEs with the 
necessary inflow of financial resources. In fact, SMEs mostly have a financial structure oriented 
towards the procurement of funds from the banking sector (D’Amato and Cacia, 2008). Not by 
chance, the Italian financial system is defined as bank-centred. However, this distinctive 
characteristic has implied a marginal role of the Italian stock market. The development of the 
Italian stock exchange has been slow and a limited number of firms rely on the financing role 
of equity markets (Aiello and Silipo, 1997). Consequently, a poor representativeness of the 
Italian economy is provided by the stock exchange – listed industrial and commercial 
companies account for just 5% of the national value added (Consob, 2011). 
Overall, a scarce propensity of firms, especially of SMEs, towards listing is evident. The low 
interest in going public is traditionally linked to the peculiar characteristics of SMEs. These are, 
for example, the entrepreneur’s fear of losing control of the family business, the reluctance in 
offering share capital to third parties, the lack of a managerial culture projected towards 
advanced financial management, the will to maintain high levels of informality in corporate 
governance, and a resistance to transparency and information release (D’Amato and Cacia, 
2008). 
Yet, the lack of diversified financing channels represents a potential constraint to the 
development and growth of Italian companies (Paleari et al., 2008). The reliance on bank credit 
                                                 
1 A SME, as defined by Italian law, is a company falling under the category of micro, small and medium-
sized enterprise. It is an enterprise with less than 250 employees and registering no more than €50 
million in annual turnover or no more than €43 million in annual total assets. More specifically, within 
this category of firms, a small business is an enterprise with less than 50 employees and annual total 
revenues or assets not exceeding €10 million, and a micro business is an enterprise with less than 10 
employees and annual total revenues or assets not exceeding €2 million (Decreto Ministeriale, 2005). 
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is not sustainable in the medium-long term for companies that intend to grow and compete on 
international markets. Therefore, there is the need to reduce the dependence on the banking 
sector and access new forms of finance. In this respect, the decision to go public represents a 
stable alternative to support internal and external growth opportunities. 
In this direction, Borsa Italiana2 has promoted the development of an equity market targeting 
the expansion of small-sized firms: following the experience of the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE), Borsa Italiana created AIM Italia, the secondary market dedicated to SMEs. This 
initiative aims to respond to the financing needs of smaller companies, while building on the 
economic specificities of the Italian context (Cacia and D’Amato, 2008). In fact, the design of 
AIM considers the most critical aspects of the Italian economy, including the lower financial 
culture of small-sized companies, the lower formalisation of the governance and management 
processes of SMEs, the difficulty for SMEs in meeting listing requirements and in facing the 
long and onerous listing process (Franzosi and Pellizzoni, 2003). Furthermore, at domestic 
level, initiatives favouring the access to alternative funding channels and capitalisation through 
risk capital have been implemented by policy makers. In actual fact, over the last couple of 
years, numerous incentives3 have been formulated to encourage companies, in particular SMEs, 
to list on AIM Italia (Annese et al., 2019).  
AIM Italia thus represents an alternative means to raise financial resources. For the 
entrepreneurial reality of our country, the possibility of accessing AIM constitutes an important 
boost to the development and expansion of SMEs. With this in mind, the following pages 
present the unique and interesting setting provided by AIM Italia. 
 
                                                 
2 Borsa Italiana S.p.A. was founded in 1998, as a result of the privatisation of the Italian financial market, 
and is the company that manages the functioning of the Italian stock market.  
3 The regulation on PIRs, the tax credit on listing costs, the spreading of SPACs, have all contributed to 
enlarging the financing opportunities for SMEs. 
-The Italian budget law (2017) introduced the regulation regarding PIRs (Piani Individuali di 
Risparmio), which are individual saving schemes. PIR saving schemes must invest at least 3.5% in 
financial instruments listed on MTFs, namely AIM Italia, and issued by SMEs. The objective of PIRs is 
to boost the flow of national savings invested in Italian firms; to achieve this goal, investors are 
stimulated to invest their savings in PIR-compliant products through tax incentives. 
-From January 2018 until December 2020, SMEs are granted the concession of a tax credit, up to a 
maximum amount of €500 thousands, on 50% of the advisory costs incurred for listing on the stock 
market. These costs include all expenses related to the specific advice needed to assess the feasibility of 
the IPO and to support the company during the process (IR Top Consulting, 2018b). 
-Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are an instrument to help companies to get listed. 
They are an investment vehicle, with no previous operating activities, set up by a team of promoters 
with the aim of raising capital through an initial public offering and subsequently deploying it to acquire 
or merge with a private company – that, as a result of the business combination, will be listed on the 
stock exchange (Borsa Italiana, 2018). 
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1.1.1 Introduction to AIM Italia 
 
The very first attempts to establish second markets for growing companies date back to the 
1980s. In these years, the so-called feeder markets were established, starting from the US; but 
most of them did not survive to the 1987 stock market crash. In this direction, further attempts 
at domestic level were made during the subsequent decade: the AIM in 1995 (UK), the Nouveau 
Marché in 1996 (France), the Neuer Markt in 1997 (Germany) and the Nuovo Mercato in 1999 
(Italy). The growth of these markets, however, was limited only to their earliest years (Revest 
and Sapio, 2011). In this respect, AIM UK represents an exception, being an example of 
resilience. AIM UK is, in fact, the only second-tier market for growing companies within the 
European context that has managed to survive. Actually, it has not only managed to survive, 
but it has also been subject to an extraordinary growth in capitalisation and number of listings, 
thus becoming the world’s leading market for growing companies (London Stock Exchange, 
2015). 
Given its success, AIM UK has been taken as a model by numerous national exchanges, 
including Borsa Italiana. In December 2008, following the acquisition of Borsa Italiana by the 
LSE, AIM Italia was born as an imitation of the successful AIM UK. 
Until a decade ago, the Italian stock market offered limited listing possibilities to SMEs. Hence, 
the AIM has filled an offer gap, by providing milder access requirements and rules more 
consistent with the characteristics of small-sized firms and of the Italian economy (Cacia and 
D’Amato, 2008). 
Of course, a series of attempts to create a stock market for SMEs, in Italy, had been launched 
before. In this regard, Figure 1.1 illustrates the evolution of the Italian stock exchange during 














Figure 1.1: Evolution of the markets dedicated to SMEs 
 
Source: Borsa Italiana 
 
The Expandi market has been, for instance, an alternative proposed for the access of small-
sized companies to the financial market. Given the limited results obtained by the latter market, 
a further experiment took place in 2007 with the creation of the Mercato Alternativo del 
Capitale (MAC), designed for the needs of SMEs. Yet, in 2012, only 11 companies were listed 
on the MAC. Therefore, it merged into AIM Italia, rationalising the offer of Italian markets 
dedicated to SMEs and with the aim of creating a single and successful market addressed to this 
category of firms. 
AIM Italia is a Multilateral Trading Facility (MTF) pursuant to the MiFID directive4. This 
means that AIM is not a regulated market as defined by law, but an exchange-regulated market 
(Ighini and Tambalo, 2016). In other words, it is not subject to the regulations of Consob5, it is 
                                                 
4 The MiFID directive has brought important changes in the market structure of European capital 
markets. MTFs, of which AIM is the most representative reference model, are regulated through the 
MiFID. 
The MiFID directive conceives MTFs as an alternative place of exchange for financial instruments 
already listed on regulated markets. Actually, MTFs frequently appear as autonomous markets, 
coordinated by the same management company of regulated markets, whose peculiar characteristic is 
that the rules concerning admission to trading, information transparency and market microstructure are 
established mainly by the management company and only minimally by the law or regulations 
(Ferragina et al., 2008). 
5 The Consob (Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa) is the regulatory body which governs 
Italian equity markets. 
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subject to the regulations issued by Borsa Italiana instead – that are, as explained in Paragraph 
1.2, the Issuers' Regulation and the Nomad Regulation. 
Furthermore, in December 2017, AIM Italia was registered as a SME Growth Market, which is 
a new sub-category of the MTFs – introduced by MiFID II – aimed at facilitating access to 
capital for SMEs. An advantage lies in the SME Growth Market qualification; in fact, such 
qualification contributes to increasing the visibility and standing of AIM Italia and of AIM-
listed companies, also allowing them to benefit from the future regulatory initiatives dedicated 
to these markets (Il Sole 24 ore, 2017). 
 
1.1.2 Key figures 
 
Last year AIM Italia celebrated its tenth anniversary; from 2009, 186 companies listed on this 
market, including market transfers (14), takeover bids (12) and delistings (24) (4AIM SICAF, 
2020). 
As of today, 35% of the companies on the Italian stock market are listed on AIM Italia. The 
Table 1.1 below indicates some general figures of the Italian market dedicated to SMEs, like 
the total number of companies, the total capital raised in IPOs and the market capitalisation 
(Source: Borsa Italiana). 
 
Table 1.1: Key figures of AIM Italia 
Companies 133 (as of 09.11.2020)  
Sectors 10 
Total Money Raised at IPO  €3.9 billion 
Total Market Capitalisation  €5.6 billion 
Source: Personal elaboration from Borsa Italiana 
 
The number of IPOs on AIM Italia has steadily been increasing in the last years (view Figure 
1.2). In 2019, the AIM recorded its highest yearly number of placements, marking a new record 
with 35 new listings, of which 31 IPOs and 4 admissions post business combination (versus 26 
IPOs and 5 listings in 2018). Given these promising results, AIM Italia is becoming a leading 
European financial hub – as of the number of new companies listed on non-regulated markets 
(Finanza Operativa, 2020). 
The median value of capital raised when joining AIM Italia is €5 million, and the majority of 





Figure 1.2: Market Cap and number of AIM Italia companies, 2009-2018 
 
Source: EnVent Capital Markets, 2019 
 
In general, business activities conducted by AIM-listed companies are diversified, testifying 
the variety of the national economic context. The most relevant sectors in terms of company 
concentration are finance and insurance (25%), services (18%), industry (17%) and technology 
(12%) (Annese et al., 2019). 
While as for geographical distribution, Northern Italy is more represented. The regions most 
present on AIM are: Lombardy (41%), Emilia-Romagna (14%), Lazio (11%) and Veneto (8%) 
(Finanza Operativa, 2020). 
On an aggregate level, in 2018, non-financial companies (excluding SPACs) recorded 
consolidated revenues of €7.2 billion and EBITDA of approximately €1 billion. At company 
level, in the same year, more than half of the AIM-listed companies had a turnover of less than 
€30 million and an EBITDA of around €4 million. Moreover, the total number of employees 
working for the AIM-listed firms in 2018 were about 20,000 (Annese et al., 2019).  
In addition, the 41% of AIM companies are classified as SMEs according to EU regulations 
and 29% are innovative SMEs6. Nearly half of them have conducted acquisitions and a third of 
them hold at least one patent (Annese et al., 2019). 
If governance is considered, the ownership structure of firms listed on AIM Italia tends to be 
quite concentrated. In particular, more than half are controlled by a shareholder holding more 
than 50% of the stakes (Ciavarella et al., 2018). 
Finally, as for transparency, it is clear that AIM companies are less prone to voluntary 
disclosure. In 2018, only 17% of AIM companies voluntarily disclosed quarterly financial 
information (Ciavarella et al., 2018). 
                                                 
6 The definition of innovative SME is given by the Investment Compact Decree (Law n.33 of 24 March 
2015). Innovative SMEs must meet requirements relating to R&D expenditure, staff qualifications and 
technological innovation, and can benefit from some tax advantages and incentives. 
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1.2 Regulation of AIM Italia 
 
The regulation of AIM Italia incorporates the main features of AIM UK, with slight adaptations 
in order to better respond to the peculiarities of the Italian economy (Ferragina et al., 2008). 
Recall that AIM is a MTF and, therefore, not a regulated market; it is instead an exchange-
regulated market subject to the rules approved by Borsa Italiana. These rules are intentionally 
simplified in order to meet the needs of SMEs, which find it difficult to comply with the stricter 
norms of the main market. In fact, the key difference characterising the AIM with respect to the 
main market consists in considerably less stringent obligations and simpler listing process. 
According to Revest and Sapio (2011), AIM Italia is regulated through a principle-based 
approach7, meaning that the assessment of the firm’s suitability is performed by a specialised 
financial intermediary (the NOMinated ADviser) who holds discretionary power in conducting 
the evaluation. Actually, the figure of the Nomad, who acts as gatekeeper, adviser and, 
ultimately, regulator of AIM-listed companies, is central in AIM. 
The following pages deal with the listing requirements of AIM Italia and provide some insight 
into the main steps/subjects involved in the listing process. 
 
1.2.1 Listing requirements 
 
The regulatory system of AIM Italia is extremely flexible if compared to other markets, with 
less stringent obligations and lower costs. For instance, unlike other markets, going public on 
AIM is subject to the compliance with few and simple conditions and does not require meeting 
minimum requisites in terms of size, positive track record or corporate governance (Ferragina 
et al., 2008). 
The formal requirements, which refer to the admission, oversight and disclosure processes, are 
detailed in the Regulations of AIM Italia. The regulatory system is based on two main 
regulations: the ‘Regulation of the Issuer’ and the ‘Regulation of the Nomad’. 
 
The ‘Regulation of the Issuer’ dictates the pre- and post-IPO requirements, which are briefly 
described below (Source: Borsa Italiana). 
In order to go public, AIM Italia requires the issuer firm to meet the following obligations: 
                                                 
7 Conversely, the main market is regulated through a rules-based approach, meaning that the listing 




 to be established as a joint stock company (S.p.A), or as the analogous of a joint stock 
company in the legislation of the country of origin; 
 to appoint the Nomad; 
 to respect the free float eligibility criteria. The free float must be of at least 10%, this is 
the minimum portion of floating shares required on the market and must be split among 
at least 5 professional investors (or, alternatively, among 10 investors, 2 of whom 
professionals); 
 to prepare the admission document, alias prospectus. The prospectus contains 
information relating to the company's business, management, shareholders and 
economic-financial data; yet, it contains less information and not all the chapters 
envisaged for the traditional prospectus; 
 to release the last audited financial statement. Where existent, the company’s latest 
financial statement must be prepared according to national or IAS/IFRS standards and 
be certified by a statutory auditor. The presence of a minimum number of financial 
statements is not required; 
 to have a website. 
The satisfaction of the above-mentioned pre-IPO requirements is definitely easier than 
complying with main market norms. In reality, the most difficult part consists in being able to 
convince the Nomad that the company in question is ready to go public on AIM Italia (Ferragina 
et al., 2008). 
Moreover, companies listed on AIM Italia must satisfy the following post-IPO requisites: 
 to have a Nomad. If the firm ceases to have a Nomad, the security is temporarily 
suspended from trading on AIM Italia, and the failure to reappoint a Nomad within two 
months represents the ground for a withdrawal from trading (the admission to the market 
is cancelled); 
 to appoint a specialist or underwriter. The presence of a specialist is necessary to support 
the liquidity of the stock. The presence of this figure, like that of the Nomad, must be 
continuous. The specialist must also make at least two researches per year concerning 
the issuer, in correspondence of the yearly and half-yearly publication of the operating 
results, which must be published on the Borsa Italiana website no later than one month 
from the approval of the accounting data; 
 to publish the half-yearly and annual reports on economic-financial performance: the 
balance sheet, income statement, cash flow statement must be released. The half-yearly 
report must be presented within three months from the end of the period in question, 
and the annual financial statement must instead be presented within six months from the 
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end of the financial year. Also, the annual financial statements must be subject to 
statutory audit while this is not the case for the half-yearly reports. Accounting 
information can be prepared just in Italian (English is optional); 
 to have a website. It is mandatory to manage a website where information relating to 
the description of the business and its management, the statute, the financial statements, 
press releases, the admission document, the Nomad and the significant shareholders are 
made available; 
 to disclose information on price sensitive and extraordinary operations; 
 to appoint a SDIR. The issuer must appoint a SDIR (System of Dissemination of 
Regulated Information) to ensure that the required information is communicated in the 
manner and within the timeframe contemplated by the regulation. 
 
Tables 1.2 below summarise the pre- and post-IPO requirements of AIM-listed firms. Also 
information relating to the main market (MTA) is inserted, for the sake of comparison. 
 
Table 1.2a: Pre-IPO Requirements 
Requirements AIM MTA 
Market cap No formal requirement Minimum €40m 
Audited financial statements 1 (if existent) 3 
Accounting principles Italian or international International 
Free float 10% 25% 
IPO offer Mainly institutional Institutional, retail 
Documents required Admission document Prospectus, SCG, Business plan 
Governance No formal requirement Recommended 
Website Mandatory Mandatory 
Advisors Nomad Sponsor/Global coordinator 
Source: Personal elaboration from Borsa Italiana 
 
Table 1.2b: Post-IPO Requirements 
Requirements AIM MTA 
Quarterly data No formal requirement No formal requirement 
Half-yearly data Mandatory (within 3 months) Mandatory (within 3 months) 
Annual report Mandatory (within 6 months) Mandatory (within 4 months) 
Information disclosure Price sensitive and extraordinary 
transactions 
Price sensitive and extraordinary 
transactions 
Governance8 No formal requirement Recommended 
Website Mandatory Mandatory 
Specialist Mandatory both Nomad and Specialist Optional 
Source: Personal elaboration from Borsa Italiana 
                                                 
8 Common market practices consist in having at least one independent director in the corporate body 
and in having members of the board of statutory auditors that are independent. 
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Furthermore, it is worth to point out that listing on AIM Italia is not only subject to the 
fulfilment of formal requirements. In fact, Borsa Italiana recommends to verify – before starting 
the listing process – the presence of a series of substantial requirements, in order to understand 
whether the company being listed can be considered adequate for going public and attractive 
by institutional investors. Substantial requirements regard the characteristics and growth 
prospects of the company in question and should not be underestimated9, since they are 
necessary for third parties’ appreciation. 
 
1.2.2 Steps and subjects involved in the listing process 
 
The process of admission to listing on AIM Italia is characterised by a short timing, especially 
if compared to other markets10. It is estimated to last for about 12 weeks (view Figure 1.3). 
The timing may last a little longer if the company, before starting the listing process, is not 
“ready” and requires a pre-IPO preparation phase – meaning that it must implement significant 
internal reorganisation activities (Ighini and Tambalo, 2016). 
 
Figure 1.3: Indicative timetable 
 
Source: London Stock Exchange, 2015 
 
A brief summary of the main steps of the listing process is explicated below (view Table 1.3) 
(London Stock Exchange, 2015). 
                                                 
9 Such characteristics include some strategic, economic-financial and organisational aspects of the 
company. For example, these are: a successful track record, a clear vision, growth potential of the 
business model, a good competitive positioning; company’s credibility, management expertise and 
integrity; solid financial structure, transparent financial communication to the market; orientation 
towards internationalization, value creation and innovation capacity (Source: Borsa Italiana). 
10 It is reasonable to expect a minimum timing of the IPO process of 6-8 months for MTA and 3-4 
months for AIM Italia, without considering the pre-IPO activities (Borsa Italiana, 2018). 
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In the 12 weeks prior to listing, the preparation phase for the listing begins. This phase 
comprehends the choice of the Nomad, the definition of the work plan with the Nomad and the 
nomination of the other advisors involved. The preliminary assessment of the company is made, 
together with the verification of IPO requirements, the understanding of the strategic objectives 
of the business plan, and the construction of the equity story and of the investor relations 
strategy. In addition, the Nomad must start preparing the due diligence, by reviewing 
problematic fields of concern, and must draft the documents required for listing (the admission 
document11). 
In the 6 weeks prior to listing, the due diligence practices12 and the admission document are 
completed. The Nomad sets out the marketing strategy for the IPO and the structure of the 
roadshow. Also, the presentation for investors is prepared, further meetings with the financial 
community are held, the roadshow and book-building13 activities are carried out. 
10 days before the scheduled admission date, the application for the pre-admission to Borsa 
Italiana is submitted. In the pre-admission notice, the information specified in the Issuer’s 
Regulation is contained, including a brief description of the business, information relating to 
                                                 
11 The most relevant document for listing on AIM is the Admission Document. This is not only a key 
regulatory document, but also the main marketing document. AIM regulation sets out the specific 
requirements for the admission document, which deal with four main areas: an overview of the business; 
a description of the risks linked to the firm and its shares; historical financial information; legal 
disclosures (e.g. contracts, intellectual property rights…). The approval by the Consob is not required, 
and the management of the firm is legally responsible for the contents released in the admission 
document (London Stock Exchange, 2015). 
12 In order to assess the suitability of a company, lawyers and accountants, together with the Nomad, 
conduct due diligence practices (an in-depth review of every aspect of the business). In this respect, 
availability of information is facilitated by providing all parties with the possibility to access to a virtual 
dataroom (London Stock Exchange, 2015). Due diligence involves (Ighini and Tambalo, 2016): 
-Financial due diligence: the assessment of the issuer's financial structure, such as the analysis of the net 
financial position and net working capital, and investigations on the existence of debt covenants, overdue 
commercial/financial/tax debts, overdue trade receivables and derivative contracts; 
-Business due diligence: the analysis of the issuer and its corporate group, of the business model, 
reference market, competitive positioning and strategy; 
-Fiscal due diligence: the verification of the documentation relating to the last financial year, the 
assessment of any tax disputes or tax audits in progress, of transfer pricing policies, as well as tax 
exemptions/reductions/concessions that the issuer has enjoyed in the last three years; 
-Legal due diligence: the analysis of corporate documents released during the last year, of documents 
relating to extraordinary transactions during the past three years, of relevant contracts in place, litigations 
in progress, pending proceedings, tangible and intangible assets, intellectual property, trademarks and 
patents, employees, and transactions with related parties. 
The due diligence phase usually ends with the preparation of two confidential reports, which represent 
the foundation of the admission document. In the first report, the Nomad gives an opinion on the 
accounting procedures adopted by the company and on the frequency of the processing of economic-
financial data. In the second report, the working capital report, the company’s availability of sufficient 
operating capital in the first 12 months after the listing is communicated (Ferragina et al., 2008). 
13 Book-building is the phase in which the Global coordinator collects data from institutional investors’ 
orders, sorts them out according to specific variables, hence fixing the price of the securities. 
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shareholders and members of the corporate governance, as well as relating to the characteristics 
of the placement and the expected date of admission to AIM Italia (Lovells LLP, 2009). 
1 week before admission to listing, all documents are approved, the characteristics of the offer 
are defined and the price is established. 
Finally, at least 3 trading days before the scheduled admission date, the issuer is required to 
submit the definitive application form to Borsa Italiana, together with the admission document, 
evidence of payment of the fees for admission and the declaration of the Nomad (Lovells LLP, 
2009). 
Table 1.3: Summary of the listing process 
Preparation Due diligence Admission and Placement  
Company restructuring where appropriate Formal due diligence Road-show and book-building 
Possible governance modifications Creation of equity story Pre-admission (10 days before) 
Auditing of financial statements Definition of listing-timing Admission application (3 days before) 
Adoption of international or Italian 
accounting standards 
Organisation of placement 
consortium   
Definition of business plan Pre-marketing with investors   
Initial contacts with Borsa Italiana and 
consultants    
Choice of consultants    
Adoption of adequate management control     
Source: Personal elaboration from Borsa Italiana 
 
Furthermore, as already mentioned, the most important figure involved in the listing process is 
the Nomad, who acts as a middleman between the company and the stock exchange, 
coordinating the listing process and being a guarantor for the company towards the financial 
community. 
The subjects authorised to carry out the role of the Nomad are registered on a dedicated register 
of Borsa Italiana, which can be consulted on the Borsa Italiana website. Also, the figure of the 
nominated adviser is subject to a specific set of rules, the ‘Regulation of the Nomad’, which 
claim that the Nomad must possess the following requirements: 
 to be a bank, an investment firm, financial intermediary, or a company belonging to a 
network of statutory auditing firms; 
 to submit financial statements to the opinion of a statutory auditor; 
 to have exercised corporate finance activities for at least two years, and have adequate 
experience in providing professional advice in relation to corporate finance transactions; 
 to have a sufficient number of employees to carry out the required activities; 
 to have professional executives with adequate experience and technical expertise in 
corporate finance and market practices; 
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 to be independent from the assisted firm and in no way have a conflict of interest with 
the AIM Italia firm. 
More specifically, companies that intend to list on AIM Italia are introduced by the Financial 
Advisor to the Nomad. After being appointed by the company, the Nomad has the task of 
controlling the enforcement of the obligations established in the regulations of AIM Italia: the 
Nomad guarantees to Borsa Italiana that all the listing procedures and post-listing requirements 
are respected. 
Most importantly, the Nomad is responsible for assessing the suitability of the company 
applying for admission to AIM Italia. In other words, the admission is subject to the Nomad’s 
decisions and evaluations, and the Nomad is the figure who choses whether a company can go 
public on AIM Italia. Hence, since certification by the Nomad is equivalent to admission to the 
market, the Nomad is the person responsible towards Borsa Italiana and puts at stake its own 
reputational capital (Ferragina et al., 2008). Therefore, the real challenge for firms in the initial 
phase of the listing process is to find and convince a Nomad that they are appropriate to be 
admitted to AIM Italia (Revest and Sapio, 2011). 
Together with assessing the appropriateness for quotation, the Nomad assists and guides the 
firm in the admission phase and for the entire duration of its stay on the market. In the case that 
the Nomad deems that the listed firm, for which the Nomad is operating, may no longer be 
appropriate for AIM Italia, it must notify Borsa Italiana (Lovells LLP, 2009). 
Finally, the Nomad may also perform the role of global coordinator and specialist 
(AEMConsulting, 2018). 
 
Who are the other consultants that can be involved in the listing process of AIM Italia? Table 
1.4 below provides a schematic answer to this question (Borsa Italiana, 2018). 
 




The Specialist performs the function of liquidity 
provider, guaranteeing the liquidity of the shares and 
continuously exposing on the market purchase or sale 
offers. The role of Specialist, Global Coordinator and 
Nomad can be performed by the same person, if in 




The Global Coordinator is an intermediary with the task 
of placing the company's securities on the market, after 
having defined with the company the type of target 
investors, the most appropriate price and the investor 
relations strategy to be adopted. It plays a coordinating 
role, in collaboration with the Nomad, of the entire 
operation. The role of Specialist, Global Coordinator and 
Nomad can be performed by the same person, if in 
possession of the necessary requirements. 
Legal advisor 
The legal advisor assists both the issuing company and 
the other actors involved (such as the Nomad) on legal, 
fiscal and contractual aspects connected to the listing 
process.  For instance, it supports the Nomad in 
preparing the admission document and carrying out legal 
and fiscal due diligence. 
Auditing firm 
The auditing firm, in addition to auditing the latest 
financial statements of the company being listed and 
expressing an audit opinion, verifies the reliability of the 
content of the business plan and of the admission 
document, and assesses the issuer's creditworthiness 
through a specific report on net working capital. In this 
way, the auditing firm supports the Nomad in due 
diligence activities. 
Financial advisor 
The financial advisor assists the company in the 
realization of the business plan and of the company’s 
management control system, and in evaluating the 
feasibility of the entire operation. It also supports the 
company in the organisation of the operation: in creating 
the team of actors participating in the process, in 
managing the relationship with Borsa Italiana and with 
the other actors involved in the admission process. 
Investor Relations advisor 
The Investor Relations advisor is essential to ensure the 
success of the IPO and promote SMEs as an investment 
opportunity for institutional investors. With the listing on 
AIM Italia, a continuous relationship is established 
between the company and the investors; the creation of 
the equity story and the management of the IR activity 
are strategic to promote the listed SME and to ensure the 
liquidity of the securities listed on AIM Italia. 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
In conclusion, from the previous pages, it is clear that AIM Italia has been conceived as a market 
with a regulatory approach balanced between the needs of businesses and investors. It is 
therefore possible to claim that the AIM Italia’s design, characterised by regulatory flexibility, 
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little bureaucracy and ease of access, represents the point of strength of AIM (Borsa Italiana, 
2018). 
 
1.3 The listing decision: Why listing? 
 
Most successful entrepreneurs usually arrive at a certain stage in the development of their firm 
when they need to make a delicate decision for the future: the listing decision. 
Why listing? The answer can be found in financial and non-financial reasons. Listing is a means 
of access to financial, managerial and intangible resources, which are functional to the 
development process of businesses. Thus, listing can have a strong impact on firms’ 
competitiveness, opening new horizons of growth and visibility (Borsa Italiana, 2012). 
Yet, any decision comes at a cost. Unfortunately, the majority of costs – since they are often 
not proportional to the size of the IPO – tends to weigh more on smaller firms. Instead, the same 
costs represent a lower burden for larger firms, which are better able to amortize them over 
higher sales volumes (Nielsson, 2013). As a consequence, the net benefits of going public on 
tightly regulated markets are lower for SMEs, which would rather consider listing on more 
loosely regulated markets like AIM. 
With this in mind, it must be noted that any company considering the possibility of listing will 



















Table 1.5: Why listing? Cost-benefit analysis 
   
  Staying private Going public 
PROS 
 Retain 100% of the share capital 
 Raise capital to boost organic growth 
and M&A 
 
 Remain independent from third 
parties 
 Use shares as currency 
 Improvement of the credit standing 
 Improvement of image and market 
visibility 
 Possibility to attract and retain talents 
 Ensure continuity in the generational 
transition 
 Visibility and controllability of the 
value of the firm 
 
 
 Flexibility and ease to liquidate the 
investment 
 Opportunity for diversification 
   
CONS 
 Limited resources to catch 
opportunities to accelerate growth 
 Disclosure requirements 
 
 Weaker position in macro-economic 
downturns 
 Reduction or loss of control 
 
 Limited market visibility and brand 
awareness 
 Commitment and responsibility 
towards the market 
 
 Risk of discontinuity in the 
generational transition  Costs 
   
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
1.3.1 Pros deriving from listing on AIM 
 
As previously stated, the going public decision is linked to a series of benefits. The main 
advantages for the firm and its shareholders are identified and briefly explained below. 
 
Opportunity to raise capital to promote growth & to use shares as currency. 
For most companies, the possibility of raising capital to finance growth and new valuable 
development projects plays a major role in the listing decision (Cacia and D’Amato, 2008; 
Paleari et al., 2008). In fact, thanks to the financial resources collected through the IPO, firms 
can facilitate both internal/organic growth and external growth (Ferragina, 2007). 
In addition, as for the latter, going public allows M&A transactions to be carried out through 
the exchange of shares (Ferragina et al., 2008). The shares can be used as collateral with credit 
institutions and as a form of payment, given that the value of a listed company is constantly 




Reduction of dependence on the credit system & improvement of credit standing. 
Listing does not only reduce the dependence on the banking credit system by diversifying the 
sources of financing, but also contributes to the improvement of the corporate credit standing. 
Listing allows companies to access to credit faster and more easily and to borrow more cheaply 
than unlisted companies (Pagano et al., 1996). As a matter of fact, during the IPO period, the 
interest rate on the firms’ short-term credit drops and a greater number of banks is willing to 
lend to them. 
 
Improvement of the corporate image and credibility. 
A significant benefit involves the improved visibility and brand awareness in the market, and 
strengthened credibility of the issuing company. 
Listing on the stock exchange represents for the firm an important opportunity to show up to 
the economic and financial community, hence increasing market visibility (4AIM SICAF, 
2020). Also, thanks to the greater transparency imposed by financial markets, listed companies 
acquire higher reliability compared to their unlisted competitors; not by chance, a lower degree 
of riskiness is often associated to listed companies. 
Reputation thus, on the one hand, becomes a marketing lever for the company and, on the other 
hand, allows the company to increase its bargaining power towards suppliers and customers 
(Ferragina et al., 2008). 
 
Attracting & retaining talents through stock options. 
Going public represents a possibility for the company to attract qualified managers and 
employees (Cacia and D’Amato, 2008). Attracting valuable human resources is a first necessary 
step for growth that goes hand in hand with the design of ad hoc compensation schemes, which 
help to retain the management and professional figures relevant for the development of the 
company (Ferragina, 2007). 
Borsa Italiana (2009) reports that a listed company is better able to motivate and involve 
managers and employees in the business results, through the introduction of share incentive 
schemes (e.g. stock option plans). These are compensation schemes dependent on the stock 
price evolution that create a direct link between company's performance and reward, thus 
positively influencing productivity and quality of work. 
 
Facilitation of the generational transition. 
Going public serves as a tool for solving corporate restructuring problems and problems of 
generational transition. In fact, through an IPO, it is possible to liquidate the shares of family 
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members no longer interested in the management of the firm, yet ensuring continuity to the 
business (Ferragina, 2007). 
 
Visibility and controllability of the value of the firm. 
The market value of the public firm is objective and visible by any investor. Actually, the value 
of each security is continuously displayed and updated, meaning that it is possible for anybody 
to know the cost of an investment in securities and check its evolution on the market (Ferragina, 
2007). 
 
Flexibility and ease to liquidate the investment. 
In literature, the second most cited reason for listing regards the chance, for shareholders, to 
convert wealth into cash in the future (Paleari et al., 2008). Listing on the stock exchange allows 
shareholders to monetise their investment, outlining a possible way out whenever they no longer 
wish to play an active role in the company. In other words, the negotiability of the securities on 
the market permits investors to liquidate, in whole or in part, their stakes more easily (Ferragina, 
2007). 
 
Opportunity for diversification. 
IPOs represent direct and indirect opportunities for diversification, either by divesting from the 
firm and reinvesting in other assets, or by making the firm raise capital after the IPO and acquire 
stake in other companies (Pagano et al., 1998). 
 
Besides the above mentioned advantages deriving from listing, which can be referred to going 
public in general (no matter whether on a main or second market), it must be noted that AIM 
Italia also offers some additional specific and unique benefits to IPO firms. In particular, two 
pros linked to the admission on AIM, which have already been examined in detail in Paragraph 
1.2, are listed below. 
 
Flexible regulatory environment. 
AIM Italia is built on a flexible regulatory system, enjoying lower pre- and post-quotation 
requirements compared to the MTA.  For instance, unlike regulated markets, AIM Italia does 
not require minimum admission criteria in terms of company size, corporate governance or 
economic-financial track record. The basic requirement is the continuous presence of the 
Nomad, both in the pre-admission and post-admission phases. 
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The whole set of regulatory requirements is specifically calibrated on the structure of SMEs, 
thus making AIM Italia as open as possible to growing companies (London Stock Exchange, 
2006). 
 
Fast and simplified admission process. 
AIM-listed firms benefit from a shorter timing of the admission to listing phase and from a 
reduced bureaucracy that contributes to simplifying the admission process. 
In fact, as previously mentioned, it takes SMEs less than six months from the going public 
decision to the listing on AIM Italia and, in just 10 days from the first company communication, 
the AIM is able to admit firms. Hence, if compared to the listing process on other markets, this 
second market experiences a significant reduction in the expected timing of the listing process 
(Lovells LLP, 2009). 
The admission process is not only faster, but also simpler. For example, during the listing phase, 
the IPO firm must submit only the listing document – that contains useful information for 
investors, relating to the company's business, economic-financial data and listing operation – 
and an entire prospectus is not required.  
 
1.3.2 Cons and costs of the IPO process 
 
The limits associated with listing on the stock exchange are perceived by entrepreneurs more 
or less markedly, depending on the extent of the change that the IPO process entails for their 
company. Moreover, even if going public definitely brings with it a series of significant 
advantages, on the other hand the costs are not to be underestimated. Actually, the costs of 
listing are large and, in Italy, represent for many firms a barrier14 to the going public decision. 
The main limits together with the costs connected to listing on AIM Italia are considered 
hereafter. 
 
Reduction or loss of control. 
A major disadvantage of an IPO is that the founder may lose the control of his company. 
Even if a considerable proportion of the quotas can be maintained by original shareholders, as 
a result of an initial public offering the ownership structure becomes less concentrated, due to 
                                                 
14 IPO costs on AIM Italia represent a major obstacle for SMEs wishing to go public. In this regard, IR 
Top Consulting (2018a) has conducted a market research involving the CEOs and entrepreneurs of 22 
companies listed on AIM Italia. From this analysis, it emerged that, according to 41% of the interviewed 




the dilution effect deriving from the issuance of new shares. In other words, going public 
increases the dispersion of ownership, which in turn results in a potential reduction or loss of 
control. In addition, as a consequence of the wider shareholder base and of the greater 
separation between ownership and control, agency costs are likely to increase. 
 
Disclosure requirements. 
Companies that go public are subject to specific and regular disclosure requirements. 
Unfortunately, these communication practices could play the role of deterrent from listing, even 
for SMEs considering going public on AIM Italia – where disclosure obligations are less 
stringent if compared to other markets. In fact, firms may need to publicly disclose confidential 
information that represent the driver of their competitive advantage (e.g. data on R&D projects 
or marketing strategies) to potential competitors, suppliers and customers. 
Furthermore, disclosure requirements make firms more exposed15 to the scrutiny of tax 
authorities (Pagano et al., 1998; Carpenter and Rondi, 2006): not by chance, going public 
reduces the scope for tax evasion. During the IPO period, the tax burden increases due to the 
greater visibility of IPO firms to tax authorities; according to Pagano et al. (1996), given Italy’s 
outspread tax evasion, this cost could explain the lower propensity of Italian firms – especially 
SMEs – to go public. 
 
Commitment and responsibility towards the market. 
For a newly-listed company, commitments and responsibilities towards the market matter more 
than ever before. Time, effort and attention is required from the company and its management. 
For instance, the board of directors must be ready for a greater openness and transparency, 
informing the market on the company’s financial position and updating investors on the 
corporate choices aimed at the development of the business (Borsa Italiana, 2013). 
 
Costs. 
Finally, the decision of listing is associated to a variety of costs. In particular, the costs that the 
issuer must bear in order to go public can be grouped into two macro-categories: variable 
placement costs and fixed advisory costs (IR Top Consulting, 2018b). 
Variable costs, defined as a percentage of the total capital raised, refer to the placement of the 
securities on the market. On the other hand, fixed costs – determined on the base of the 
company’s structure, size and complexity – include the whole set of consultancies necessary to 
                                                 
15 Directors and employees of listed companies operate in a more rigorous control system, which is 
subject to greater scrutiny (Borsa Italiana, 2013). 
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assess the feasibility of the IPO and to support the company during and after the listing process. 
For instance, fixed costs involve the costs relating to strategic and financial advisory (e.g. the 
Nomad), administrative and legal practices (e.g. the auditing firm), marketing, initial market 
entry (e.g. listing fees) and investor relations. 
EY (2015) points out a further distinction of costs, categorising them in direct and indirect, 
where indirect quotation costs include costs linked to the "status" of listed company. In this 
respect, the services of the investor relator or of internal audit are, among fixed costs, indirect. 
Furthermore, the IPO firm is also likely to incur a cost driven by the practice of listing and 
selling shares at a price lower than the market value: this is the case of underpricing. More 
specifically, when a new stock closes its first day of trading above the set IPO price, the stock 
has been underpriced. The underpricing of the IPOs is a particularly significant cost for Italian 
companies; Carpenter and Rondi (2006) suggest that such phenomenon could be driven by the 
adverse selection problem, arising from information asymmetries in the Italian financial market. 
 
Indeed, listing on AIM Italia entails limited costs compared to listing on the main market. The 
costs of going public on this second market are lower because of its greater regulatory flexibility 
and simpler listing process, but they are not low enough to stop being a deterrent to the listing 
decision. 
Ighini and Tambalo (2016) report that a cost of listing16 between €400 and €600 thousands 
emerges for SMEs, after having carried out an analysis of numerous admission documents and 
interviews with the representatives and advisors of AIM-listed companies. In addition to this 
cost, placement commissions – equal to 5-6% of the capital raised – must be added. IR Top 
Consulting (2018a) proposes similar findings17, registering overall IPO costs between €665 and 
€760 thousands. Moreover, it should be noted that, as the size of the company being listed 
increases, the listing costs also increase, since the involvement of a higher number of 
consultants is required. 
Borsa Italiana (2019) provides further details on the costs of listing on AIM Italia, indicating 
the size of the admission fees. A floor18 equivalent to €15 thousands (or €25 thousands) is to be 
paid for companies with a market capitalization19 smaller or equal to €20 million (or greater 
                                                 
16 The reported cost of listing is associated to capital collections that on average range between €5 and 
€10 million. 
17 Similarly to Ighini and Tambalo (2016), IR Top Observatory has estimated fixed advisory costs which, 
varying according to the complexity and characteristics of SMEs, range between €300 and €500 
thousands. As for variable placement costs, the cost estimates linked to €5-€7 million capital raised vary 
from €265 to €360 thousands (IR Top Consulting, 2018a). 
18 The floor is to be paid in advance upon submission of the application for admission on AIM Italia. 
19 Capitalization is calculated on the base of the offering price. 
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than €20 million). The cap is fixed at €500 thousands, and a €75 fee is envisaged for every €500 
thousands of market capitalisation. 
 
In conclusion, listing on the stock exchange and, in particular, on AIM Italia represents an 
opportunity for firms from multiple perspectives. However, going public also brings with it 
some disadvantages that are not to be underestimated – it is not a cost-free process. 
Yet, various costs relating to listing are incurred on a one-off basis, allowing permanent access 
to the market; hence, these costs can be considered as an investment for the medium-long term. 
Also, some of the disadvantages can be minimised if the company gradually approaches listing, 
with an adequate preparation at both the structural-organizational and cultural level (Ferragina, 
2007). 
 
Chapter 1 has focused its attention on the Italian Alternative Investment Market. An overview 
of the context within which AIM Italia has developed and of some general data about this 
growing market has been given. Afterwards, the functioning of the market, in terms of 
regulation, listing process, subjects involved, has been presented. Finally, attention has been 
turned to the listing decision, and the advantages that may derive from going public. With this 











POST-LISTING EFFECTS IN LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
 
The Initial Public Offering (IPO) is a topic that has been widely examined in literature because 
it represents a turning point in the life of a company, resulting in radical changes in the whole 
structure of the firm (e.g. in the size of its operations, in the capital structure, as well as in the 
ownership structure). Theoretical uncertainty characterises the function of the stock exchange 
and its influence on corporate performance (Alexander and Mayer, 1991; Aiello and Silipo, 
1997; Chawla, 2016). On the one hand, academics attribute to capital markets a central role for 
economic growth, since they provide companies with capital and risk diversification. Also, 
within the context of asymmetric information of financial markets, a positive signal derives 
from the fact that stock exchanges contribute to improving corporate information disclosure. 
On the other hand, capital markets are viewed as a source of distortion of firms’ choices, 
inducing to adopt a short-term perspective in investment decisions at the expense of the long-
term investments. 
A variety of perspectives has been adopted by scholars in order to deal with this field of study. 
In particular, research addresses questions about the reasons of going public and about the 
propensity of making such a critical decision. Why does a private firm engage in an IPO?20  
 
                                                 
20 The motivation of going public is often inferred through a comparison of the ex-ante and ex-post 
characteristics of IPO firms with those of private firms. The prestige and enhanced reputation of being 
publicly listed, together with the public firms’ opportunity to raise capital, seem to be primary motives 
for IPOs (Ünlü and Yalçin, 2018). Listing on the stock exchange constitutes an opportunity to collect 
equity in order to subsidize external growth through future acquisitions (Belcredi and Gualtieri, 1995; 
Brau and Fawcett, 2006); but a relatively small portion of funds appears to be used to engage in 
acquisitions, since the largest fraction is instead used to finance R&D and capital expenditures (Kim and 
Weisbach, 2008). 
According to Paleari et al. (2008), in the European main markets the decision to go public is driven by 
the firms’ need to overcome borrowing constraints, rather than to finance new investments. In contrast, 
second-tier markets like the AIM are a means to finance growth. Carpenter and Rondi (2006) suggest 
the existence of two classes of IPOs in Italy. Large companies, part of pyramidal groups, go public to 
diversify shareholders’ wealth, to maximise IPO proceeds and to transfer control, rather than turning to 
the market for funding and financing growth. In contrast, small and independent firms use the IPO 
proceeds to meet their capital needs after a period of large investments, to deleverage and rebalance their 
capital structure. The possibility of accessing to alternative sources of financing is particularly relevant 
for this kind of companies, which tend to be characterised by significant current and future investments, 
by high leverage and sustained growth. The same findings are reported by Pagano et al. (1998), once 
they make the distinction between carve-outs and independent companies. Interestingly, Pagano et al. 
(1998) also point out that public holdings seem to list their subsidiaries when their economic and 




Which variables/firm’s characteristics are most likely to affect the decision of going public?21 
Other studies have involved the analyses of the IPO’s impact on corporate performance and, in 
this respect, two main approaches have been considered. Some authors study the stock price 
dynamics of newly-listed firms, evaluating the degree of the underpricing phenomenon and 
long-term underperformance22 (market approach); others investigate the changes in the 
company from an internal point of view, by looking at post-IPO financial statements, ownership 
figures and corporate governance mechanisms (business approach). 
In addition, it is worth taking notice of the fact that the major research effort in this field has 
been given to main markets. This is why this paragraph (2.1) refers to the analyses on post-
listing effects in literature where IPO is to be intended as an initial public offering made on a 
main market. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to provide the theoretical basis for the empirical analysis 
conducted in Chapter 3. From now on, Chapter 2 pays attention to the post-listing effects on 
firms’ performance by following the business approach – disregarding the post-listing effects 
on the financial markets, since the investigation of the latter is beyond the scope of my work. I 
am particularly interested in studying the post-listing dynamics in terms of financial-economic 
                                                 
21 The probability of an IPO increases with size (Aiello and Silipo, 1997; Pagano et al., 1998; 
Chemmanur et al., 2005). The higher propensity to list of large companies is strictly linked to the need 
to diversify their sources of financing (in order to reduce the risk of the entrepreneurial activity) and to 
the need to make large-size investments. Size is also important for the recovery of fixed floatation costs. 
In addition, Aiello and Silipo (1997) propose that innovative companies, such as those in the high-tech 
industry – to which a higher riskiness is associated – are more likely to go public than traditional firms. 
Then, the likelihood of an IPO is also higher when companies face higher interest rates and concentrated 
credit sources. Age, revenue growth, market share, profitability, capital intensity, cash flow riskiness 
are all further factors influencing the inclination to an IPO (Chemmanur et al., 2005). Moreover, market 
overvaluations within the same industry are positively related to the probability of listing: in fact, under 
these conditions, companies are incentivised to go public in order to exploit mispriced stock and extract 
value from investors. 
Pagano et al. (1998) point out an interesting fact regarding size: even if the size of the company is one 
of the most important factors that positively affect the decision of an IPO, size is not relevant for the 
decision of listing carve-outs. This is possibly because fixed costs of listing subsidiaries are partly sunk, 
borne by the holding. 
22 IPO’s underpricing and long-term underperformance refer to anomalous abnormal returns of IPO 
firms. 
Underpricing is represented by high initial returns during the first trading day, when IPO firms ‘leave 
extra money on the table’ because the offer price is lower than the first-day closing price. Brau and 
Fawcett (2006) state that, according to CFOs, underpricing allows to reward investors for taking the risk 
of the IPO. Also, further reasons for underpricing are to be found in market uncertainty and imperfect 
information. 
Long-run underperformance is represented by negative abnormal returns over the longer horizon; in 
fact, for several years after the IPO, issuing firms document low stock returns. Actually, the stock of 
IPO firms underperform if compared to the stock of non-issuing firms. This could be due to the fact that 
the stock of IPO firms is priced relying on the expectation of a growing profitability, but in reality profit 
margins do not grow beyond pre-IPO levels. 
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indicators, like revenue growth, profitability, financial structure, to gain some insights into the 
effects occurring after firms go public. 
Empirical evidence obtained so far does not offer unequivocal results. Surely, the corporate 
long-term performance depends on the firms’ selection of projects and on their ability to 
generate the expected earnings. Yet, if we consider the post-listing years, the benefits of IPO 
firms in terms of accounting performance seem to be questionable. In fact, the operating 
performance of IPOs during the first years after going public appears to be characterised by an 
evident anomaly: several studies document that the accounting performance of IPOs 
deteriorates. In this respect, research argues that over time the profit margin does not grow 
beyond pre-IPO levels thus that after listing companies experience a drop in profitability. 
The empirical studies on IPOs presented in the following pages have examined the 
characteristics of newly-listed companies before and after listing; competing theories exist 
when it comes to focusing on the analyses of the effects of listing. Before illustrating the 
numerous authors who have dealt the topic and their findings, it is interesting to point out three 
considerations23. Firstly, one common aspect of the examined papers regards the sample 
identification: the great majority of studies exclude from the sample firms belonging to the 
banking and financial sectors, exclusively considering industrial non-financial companies. 
Secondly, the quotation years in question range from 1971 to 2004, hence the analysed data 
regards the last three decades of the twentieth century. Lastly, the countries which have been 
subject of study are the following: US, UK, Italy, Japan, Australia, China and Thailand. In 
literature, studies on the post-listing effects in developed economies do prevail if compared to 
those in emerging markets; yet, two papers mentioned in the following pages regard post-listing 
effects in emerging markets. Anyway, also in this case, the main finding is in line with that of 
the other studies: performance undergoes a significant deterioration after the IPO. These 
specifications suggest a certain degree of completeness in the studies involving quotations on 
main markets, in terms of time frame and geography, as well as a shared view when it comes 
to identifying which companies it is worth to examine. 
 
Theoretical uncertainty characterises the analyses of capital markets’ effects on the 
performance of newly-listed companies. Jain and Kini (1994) are the first to examine the 
operating performance of IPO firms in the US. They suggest that the companies involved in an 
IPO transaction experience a substantial decline in post-listing operating performance, 
especially if the year immediately following the listing is compared to the pre-IPO levels. The 
                                                 
23 For further details view Table 2.1 at the end of paragraph 2.1. 
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authors come up with such outcome by assessing over a six-year period the following variables: 
operating returns on assets, operating cash flows, growth of sales, asset turnover, capital 
expenditure. The median operating return on assets and operating cash flows of IPO firms 
decrease in the quotation year and keep on worsening for a few more years, while the 
corresponding industry-peers either exhibit stable patterns or decrease to a smaller extent. This 
means that the underpeformance is not to be attributed to a decline of the profitability of the 
industries in question. Simultaneously, the newly-listed firms experience high revenue growth 
and capital expenditures; thus, the decline in post-issue operating performance is also not to be 
imputed to the absence of growth opportunities or to a reduction of capital expenditures. 
Inability to sustain pre-IPO levels and declining profitability, despite the high post-listing 
revenue growth and capital expenditures, is also verified by Mikkelson et al. (1997), 
Chemmanur et al. (2005) and Ali (2017). In this respect, Chemmanur et al. (2005) document 
that sales and capital expenditures show a monotonic increasing trend before and after the IPO, 
but that the growth in sales is subject to an inverted-U shaped pattern. This implies that the peak 
in sales growth is experienced in the year of the IPO and that following the IPO sales growth 
decreases, consistently with the model of Clementi (2002)24. Paleari et al. (2008) argue that the 
implication of this finding suggests that IPOs are not used to execute valuable new investments 
and as a springboard for internal growth strategies. 
Mikkelson et al. (1997) state that the accounting performance – measured as operating income 
on assets or on sales – of US IPO firms outperforms the one of industry-matched peers during 
the year prior to listing and drops below the level of industry-matched peers during the first ten 
post-listing years. The median operating income of IPO firms, adjusted for industry effect, is 9 
cents per dollar of assets in the pre-IPO year and becomes a negative 2 cents per dollar in the 
post-IPO year. Yet, the decline in profitability limits to the first year and does not drop further 
in the following years. 
The paper identifies in age and size two factors that primarily affect the post-IPO change in 
operating performance. In other words, the degree of variation in operating performance around 
the IPO varies greatly between companies of different age and of different size. Interestingly, 
the authors find out that the worsening of the operating conditions is especially present in the 
younger and smaller firms25 and slightly less visible in the older and larger-size companies. In 
                                                 
24 Clementi (2002) creates a model to explain the dynamic pattern of the various variables prior and after 
the IPO. The author proposes that the above-mentioned patterns are consistent with the performance 
implications of a company that increases its scale of operations around the offering. 
25 Mikkelson et al. (1997) suggest that the worsening of the operating conditions is more visible in young 
and small companies because of the low sales volume, high operating costs and aggressive pricing 
strategies that tend to characterise these firms. 
37 
 
addition to confirming that listed companies experience a worsening of the post-listing 
economic and financial indexes, Mikkelson et al. (1997) note that the listed firms of their 
sample experience an extremely promising performance in the year before going public. 
As for Japan, poor post-IPO performance is confirmed. Cowling et al. (2002) examine the 
performance of Japanese newly-listed companies, from five years prior- to four years post-
going public, and a significant decline in the post-issue accounting performance is reported. 
They also investigate the growth patterns of net sales, ordinary profits and net profits, and point 
out that all three growth rates are sharply reduced after the offering. Furthermore, similarly to 
Mikkelson et al. (1997), Cai and Wei (1997) document that Japanese IPOs report peaking 
profitability levels in the year prior to going public and a deterioration of performance 
immediately after the IPO. 
In the Italian case, profitability seems to reduce after the IPO and, in general, also investments 
and financial leverage decrease (Pagano et al., 1998). These effects keep being persistent after 
the first three years from the quotation date. More specifically, the years immediately after 
going public witness a significant decrease in profitability: from a decline of -1.5% in the first 
post-IPO year to -3% in the third post-IPO year. Distinction being made between independent 
companies and carve-outs, the former experience a decrease26 of leverage and a significant 
contraction of investments, while the latter also undergo a drop in leverage but a temporary rise 
in investments. 
An interesting intuition is proven in this study: newly-listed firms are subject to a permanent 
increase in tax pressure. In fact, IPO firms pay 2% more taxes per year if compared to before 
listing (as a fraction of operating income). This is probably because the stricter transparency 
and disclosure requirements associated to going public prevent, to a certain extent, tax evasion. 
Moreover, Pagano et al. (1998) are also the first to report the lower cost of credit experienced 
by Italian companies after listing. Cheaper borrowing, which is stronger for independent 
companies than for carve-outs, is a statistically and economically significant post-listing effect 
in the IPO year and in the three post-IPO years – then, this effect starts weakening. The authors 
point out three motivations explaining the lower cost of credit. Firstly, this contraction in the 
cost of credit can be associated to the enhanced information disclosure imposed to IPO firms, 
which makes it less challenging for potential lenders to assess their creditworthiness. Secondly, 
it may be due to the IPO firms’ stronger bargaining position with banks (since IPO firms can 
more easily recur to sources of financing other than bank loans). Thirdly, the lower leverage of 
                                                 
26 When new shares are issued, leverage decreases because of the equity capital inflow that is raised. 
Everything else kept equal, the decrease in leverage is higher, the higher the percentage of equity issued 
at the offering and the greater the proportion of primary over secondary shares is. 
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IPO firms makes them a safer borrower and justifies cheaper borrowing. Thus, it is no surprise 
that, after going public, companies lower the concentration of their borrowing by relying on a 
higher number of banks willing to lend. 
Furthermore, Kim et al. (2004) are the first to examine the performance of newly-listed firms 
in an emerging market. They conduct an analysis comparable to the one of Jain and Kini (1994) 
and come up with similar trends – increasingly low operating return on assets and operating 
cash flows after the IPO, which cannot be explained by the levels of sales growth and capital 
expenditures. However, they discover that the magnitude of the decline in post-issue 
performance in Thailand is much greater if compared to that in the US. For instance, three years 
after the IPO, return on assets of Thai firms is 70% lower than that reported in the year pre-
quotation (compared to a 9% decline of the same measure in the US). 
Also China documents a decline similar to the one of Thai IPO firms and much greater than the 
one of US IPO firms. In fact, the median profitability of Chinese IPOs is about one-third lower 
three years after listing than three years prior to listing (Wang, 2005). The sharp drop in post-
issue operating performance of Chinese newly-listed firms persists both before and after 
industry adjustments. The comparison of the pre- and post-IPO levels of return on assets shows 
a 31% decline from three years before to three years after listing and a 20.9% decline from one 
year before to one year after listing. The same figures after industry adjustments turn to be 
incredibly high, 90% and 61% three years and one year after listing, respectively. 
In addition, Wang (2005) confirm that the decline in post-listing performance is in no way 
related to the underpricing phenomenon. More specifically, underpricing is not useful to explain 
and predict the operating performance of IPO firms; such outcome – in line with the findings 
of Jain and Kini (1994) – is implied by proving that the most underpriced IPO firms do not 
outperform the least underpriced IPO firms. 
Finally, a more recent paper studies the post-listing effects of Turkish IPO firms in an 
innovative way27 and still confirms findings consistent with those of the previous authors (Ünlü 
and Yalçin, 2018). 
Consequently, it is possible to claim that the aforementioned studies find evidence of a decline 
in the post-issue operating performance of IPO firms, both before and after industry 
adjustments, both in emerged and emerging markets. 
 
                                                 
27 Ünlü and Yalçin (2018) assess the post-listing performance of newly-listed companies through a 
multi-criteria evaluation: they do not only consider the accounting-based performance measures but also 
investigate the value-based performance measures (i.e. economic value added market value added, cash 
flow return on investment, cash value added and refined economic value added). 
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As for research built on the comparison between stock exchanges in different countries, two 
studies are worth mention: Paleari et al. (2008) and Carpenter and Rondi (2006). 
The size of the equity markets in UK and Italy is very different28, yet Paleari et al. (2008) believe 
that a comparison between these two provides further insights into the differences between 
Anglo-Saxon markets, on the one hand, and the markets of Continental Europe, on the other 
hand. Their finding, which is valid for both London’s and Milan’s stock exchange, suggests 
that after the IPO there is no significant change in the level of capital expenditures and in the 
growth rate of sales – differently from the aforementioned literature. In addition, post-listing 
operating underperformance is testified by a permanent and significant drop in profitability, 
measured in terms of return on assets and return on equity. However, if cash flow return on 
assets is considered, the decline in profitability persists but is no more significant. 
Moreover, while the IPO on the LSE often results in a rebalanced capital structure, the IPO in 
Italy – in line with previous studies – only temporarily deleverages the companies. This is 
because the Italian companies following the IPO can recur to further debt capital at a lower 
interest rate. Such result suggests that, while the reduction of debt exposure for companies listed 
on the LSE is permanent and the IPO is a means for rebalancing their financial structure, in 
Italy the stock exchange is a source of capital exploited when other sources (e.g. bank financing) 
are too expensive. Thus, in the two countries a relatively different perception of the stock 
exchange’s role is evident, which to a certain extent also reflects in the characteristics of newly-
listed companies: in Italy the firms that go public are larger and older compared to their English 
counterparts. 
In the same way, in Italy the firms that go public are larger and older also compared to their US 
counterparts. In fact, Carpenter and Rondi (2006) report that Italian IPO firms are larger in 
terms of sales, total assets, employment and that they tend to be quite old when going public 
(the median age is 23). This paper aims to investigate the consequences of listing in Italy and 
in the US, paying a particular attention to growth outcomes. The growth rates of total assets, 
fixed capital and sales of Italian companies are positive, both before and after the IPO; but if 
compared to the growth rates of US companies they are extremely small. On average, after 
going public US IPO firms grow rapidly while Italian IPO firms exhibit slower growth rates. 
This finding is not linked to the greater initial size of Italian IPO firms, because it persists when 
only large-size comparable US firms are considered – also in this case, growth rates of US IPO 
firms are twice as large. Yet, the paper points out that going public has a positive impact on the 
                                                 
28 As of the end of 2018, the English market capitalization is four times higher than that of Italy (Source: 




Italian small and independent firms, which seem to use the listing on the stock exchange as a 
means for growth. 
Hence, in general, listing in Italy does not guarantee a faster growth. According to Carpenter 
and Rondi (2006), policy makers should not only facilitate the access to capital markets but also 
provide incentives for the IPO firms to use the raised capital to grow. 
 
Further scholars focus their attention on the comparison of listed and non-public companies, 
comparable by industry sector and size. These studies aim to verify whether the status of listed 
company is related to differences in performance and financial structure compared to the status 
of unlisted company. 
A first study in this direction is conducted by Alexander and Mayer (1991) who, by comparing 
English listed and unlisted industrial companies in the eighties, highlight that listed companies 
invest more and grow faster. The more rapid growth of English listed firms is measured in terms 
of sales, employment and investment. Yet, the authors point out that such outcome is attained 
mostly through acquisitions rather than being imputed to an organic growth. Also, on average, 
listed firms are more profitable than their unlisted counterparts. The profit margin of both types 
of companies is subject to an increase in the analysed period, but the profit margin of listed 
companies keeps being appreciably higher (a 40% difference is recorded with respect to 
unlisted companies). As for the financial structure, listed firms finance themselves by raising 
more equity capital or through medium- and long-term loans; instead, unlisted firms tend to 
invest retained profit or to raise short-term loans. Hence, the English quoted and unquoted firms 
seem to be characterised by a diverse financial structure. 
Alexander and Mayer (1991) conclude that the performance of listed companies is impressive 
compared to that of their unlisted counterparts: data show that listed firms outperform unlisted 
ones. Therefore, the authors presume that there is no evidence in favour of the hypothesis that 
the stock exchange, or being listed, has a negative effect on corporate performance. Conversely, 
the access to capital markets for British companies seems to be beneficial for their performance. 
However, the same conclusion is not true for Italy. The existence of statistically significant 
differences between companies newly-listed on the Italian stock exchange and unlisted firms is 
firstly verified by Belcredi and Gualtieri (1995): listing on the Italian stock exchange does not 
seem to accelerate and encourage growth. They discover that the sales of listed companies do 
not grow to a greater extent than those of unlisted companies; the post-IPO change in tangible 
and financial fixed assets is recorded to be higher for listed firms and this is attributable to 
external growth operations. In addition, their analysis testifies a significantly higher 
profitability (measured as return on sales) of listed companies only in the period immediately 
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preceding the listing and in the year immediately following the listing. In this respect, the paper 
points out the Italian companies’ inclination to undertake the listing process in correspondence 
of their peak economic results, with the aim of maximizing their stock offering price. As for 
leverage, listed companies seem to be characterised by a more balanced financial structure; 
however, the reduction in leverage is only temporary. In fact, it emerges that at the IPO Italian 
firms rely on capital increases to improve their financial structure, but that following the IPO 
listed companies resort to debt more than unlisted companies – increasing their long-term debt 
again and returning to a ratio between long-term debt and equity that is similar to the one of the 
pre-IPO period. 
Also the subsequent Italian studies contradict the findings of Alexander and Mayer (1991) on 
the quoted firms’ higher growth and higher profits. 
Pagano et al. (1996) suggest that in the period following the listing listed companies are subject 
to a reduction in profits, investments and leverage. For instance, they propose that the return on 
investment for listed companies exceeds the one of unlisted companies only in the pre-IPO 
period. The authors highlight a lower post-IPO revenue growth of listed companies compared 
to unlisted ones together with an increase in the interest of credit institutions to work with 
newly-listed firms. Interestingly, they also verify that newly-listed companies do pay more 
taxes if compared to private companies, especially from the IPO period onwards. 
Aiello and Silipo (1997) suggest that capital markets play a role in improving the productive 
efficiency of enterprises. They state that, in the analysed period, listed companies show higher 
levels of productive efficiency but not of profitability with respect to unlisted companies. In 
fact, listed companies are generally more efficient in that their productivity levels per employee 
are almost twice those of unlisted companies. On the other hand, the return on investment is 
lower for listed companies. Hence, Aiello and Silipo (1997) imply that the greater productive 
efficiency that characterises the listed companies in their sample is not sufficient to determine 
a greater overall profitability of these companies. 
Finally, Bonaccorsi di Patti (1999) claims that the growth of unlisted companies is greater than 
that of listed companies, in terms of revenues, value added and fixed assets. For instance, the 
unlisted firms’ growth rate of total revenues is more than double if compared to the same growth 
rate for listed companies. Moreover, the author reports that the profitability of unlisted 
companies is no different from the profitability of listed companies. In fact, the average 
profitability of unlisted firms is higher – more than double – in terms of return on assets but 
lower in terms of return on sales. 
Thus, from the above-mentioned studies, it is clear that substantial differences exist between 
listed and unlisted firms. Findings on growth and profitability are not always consistent in 
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literature. While the stock exchange is seen as a growth engine in the Anglo-Saxon markets, 
the same does not apply to the Italian market where a financial role of the stock exchange 
emerges. Overall, non-conflicting findings are found regarding the financial structure of listed 
versus unlisted firms: both the English and Italian studies find out that unquoted firms are 
characterised by a greater orientation towards short-term loans. 
 
The literature presented so far has focused on the economic-financial aspects of listing on the 
stock exchange. Putting aside the studies that merely pay attention to the post-listing operating 
performance, another interesting research focus that is worth to mention relates to the 
investigation of post-IPO changes at the managerial-ownership level. Clearly, going public 
increases the dispersion of ownership: even if a considerable proportion of the quotas can be 
maintained by substantial29 shareholders30, as a result of an initial public offering the ownership 
structure becomes less concentrated, due to the dilution effect deriving from the issuance of 
new shares. Consequently, the monitoring of management by shareholders tends to decrease 
and the incentives of managers could potentially worsen. 
There is a long tradition of research regarding the relation between ownership and corporate 
performance. Ownership seems to play a role in explaining the underperformance of newly-
listed firms, yet evidence is not conclusive. 
A positive relation between the proportion of ownership retained by original shareholders and 
variations in performance is proposed by Jain and Kini (1994). A positive relation implies that 
the higher the proportion of shares retained by pre-listing owners, the lower the decline in the 
operating performance from before to after the IPO; in other words, this means that IPO firms 
where a higher degree of ownership is retained are subject to superior operating performance. 
More specifically, firms characterised by high ownership retention – if compared to firms 
characterised by low ownership retention – enjoy a significantly superior operating 
performance in each of the four post-listing years31, relative to the pre-listing year. On the other 
hand, these results are rejected by Mikkelson et al. (1997), who find no relation between 
changes in ownership during the IPO period and operating performance. 
                                                 
29 Substantial shareholders own 5% or more of total outstanding shares. 
30 Paleari et al. (2008) state that in Italy, before going public, 96.6% of the shares are held by substantial 
shareholders and, after the issue, 60% of shares remain in the same hands. As for the management team, 
literature reports that managers, following an IPO, continue to hold a significant amount of shares or, 
alternatively, that they are provided with substitute incentives (for instance, with compensation through 
stock options). 
31 Superior operating performance, measured in terms of operating cash flow and sales growth, is 
recorded (even after industry adjustments are made) in years 0, +1, +2, +3, relative to year -1 – where 
year 0 is the listing year. 
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Mikkelson et al. (1997) do not only point out that corporate performance is in no way correlated 
to the evolution of the ownership structure. In particular, Mikkelson et al. (1997) analyse the 
relationship between the change in managerial ownership over 10 post-listing years and the 
operating performance of newly listed companies. They suggest that changes in the ownership 
structure resulting from the IPO32 do not lead to changes in incentives, because managers 
continue to hold substantial stake in the firm and thanks to stock-based compensation 
mechanisms. Hence, this study rejects interests-misalignment between managers and 
shareholders. 
Similarly to Mikkelson et al. (1997), also Cai and Wei (1997) report a non-significant relation 
between ownership and variations in performance33: the operating underperformance (e.g. 
decline in profitability) of high managerial ownership firms is not significantly different from 
that of low managerial ownership firms. 
The findings of Cowling et al. (2002) contrast with those of Cai and Wei (1997). In addition to 
age and size, also the managerial ownership structure is found to contribute to the firms’ 
operating performance pre- and post-listing; a reduction in managerial ownership drives a 
deterioration of the post-listing operating performance, by potentially increasing agency costs. 
In fact, the top shareholder’s ownership stake influences positively and significantly the growth 
rate of net sales and the growth rate of profits. When the top shareholder decreases its ownership 
post-listing, performance results are inferior (the very same relationship is found to exist also 
for the top 10 shareholders’ ownership34). In this direction, another interesting contribution is 
made by Balatbat et al. (2004), who study the relation between the ownership structure of 
Australian IPOs and operating performance, for up to 5 years post-listing. 
Balatbat et al. (2004) state that ownership35 is subject to a monotonic decrease during the 5 
post-IPO years. Such decrease is more evident during the first post-listing year, indicating that 
owners prefer to exploit investors’ overoptimism and divest immediately after the IPO. 
Moreover, this study claims that a significantly positive relation between insider ownership and 
operating performance exists, but only for the fourth and fifth post-listing year. In other words, 
                                                 
32 Managerial ownership declines from 67.9% pre-IPO to 43.7% immediately after listing, 28.6% five 
years after listing and 17.9% ten years after listing. 
33 The authors suggest that, perhaps, such conclusion could be due to the peculiar legal and regulatory 
environment of Japan, which gives firms a larger freedom to own shares and exercise control, hence 
controlling for agency costs. 
34 Cowling et al. (2002) report the following data on ownership stakes. After the IPO, the top 
shareholder’s stake diminishes from 29.82% to 22.87% and the top 10 shareholders’ stake diminishes 
from 80.54% to 63.70%. Yet, despite this decrease, it is clear that ownership is still concentrated one 
year after the offering: the top 10 shareholders continue to hold considerably large stakes. 
35 5 years post-listing, managerial ownership equals 28% and the top 20 shareholders hold about 80% 
of total shares. 
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the statistically significant impact of ownership on performance is not immediate36. The late 
recognition of this relationship may be explained in two ways: firstly, the relation could become 
visible only after the companies with the most fragile prospects have already failed; secondly, 
an upward manipulation of earnings during the 3 post-listing years could confound the attempts 
to observe an existent underlying relation. 
Furthermore, a non-linear relation between the proportion of ownership retained by original 
shareholders and variations in operating performance is first documented by Kim et al. (2004). 
The authors state that companies with a high or low degree of ownership retained show a 
positive relationship between ownership and operating performance, while the opposite is true 
for companies with a medium degree of ownership retained. In a similar way, also Wang 
(2005)37 documents a curvilinear relationship between ownership (and concentration of 
ownership) and variations in performance. 
To recap, according to most pieces of research, a positive relation between ownership and 
performance appears to exist and the decline in managerial ownership post-IPO explains the 
drop in profitability. Then, with this in mind, the size of the ownership stake retained could be 
seen as an effective means to align the incentives of managers and shareholders. Some relatively 
more recent studies propose a non-linear relation between the proportion of ownership retained 
by original shareholders and variations in operating performance; instead, according to others, 
no relation at all exists. Thus, overall, evidence on the relation between ownership and corporate 
performance is not conclusive. 
 
The common ground behind the above-mentioned empirical contributions is the tendency 
towards a significant worsening of the operating performance of newly listed firms, testified by 
analyses conducted on the main financial indexes and ratios. Yet, this trend of 
underperformance is in literature one of the least explained regularities. Several theoretical 
explanations to justify this anomaly have been provided, but it is challenging to identify the 
exact motive for a decline in post-IPO operating performance. The reasons proposed by various 
scholars, starting from Jain and Kini (1994), to justify this phenomenon are attributable to: 
1. the willingness and ability of management to choose the right timing for the quotation; 
                                                 
36 The statistically significant impact of ownership on performance is not present in the first 3 years 
post-listing. 
37 Wang (2005) studies the Chinese listed firms’ operating performance around the IPO period, trying 
to reveal the relationship between ownership and performance. In this particular paper, for ownership, 
non-state ownership is intended: that is, in other words, legal-entity ownership (e.g. shares held by 
domestic institutions, like listed firms or financial institutions). 
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2. window dressing practices prior to listing, in order to obtain higher growth expectations 
and a better pre-IPO assessment; 
3. the increase in agency costs due to the greater separation between ownership and 
control. 
1. The first explanation concerns the timing of the offering. The authors claim that the initial 
public offering takes place in a moment of very positive operating performance. It is then 
possible that the decline is not linked to the offer itself but that it is physiological to the firm’s 
lifecycle, since the company made its going public decision when experiencing a peak in its 
economic-financial performance, which is clearly not possible to sustain in the future (Akhigbe 
et al., 2006). 
The timing of going public does not only take in account the favourable corporate conditions 
but also promising market conditions38. For instance, an overvaluation of comparable 
companies39 in the same industry or a reduced scrutiny of investors may incentivise a private 
firm to go public: such practice of taking advantage of market optimism, in periods of generally 
high stock prices, is referred to in literature as ‘windows of opportunity’40. However, the 
practice of timing the going public decision under these circumstances (in periods of high 
industry valuation) signals unfavourable future industry conditions. In fact, it is not surprising 
to observe poor stock performance after periods of high optimism or high volumes issued (Ali, 
2017). 
2. The second reason consists in the so-called window dressing practice, which makes the firm 
shine or, in other words, ameliorates the appearance of a firm’s financial statements prior to 
listing – in order to obtain a better stock price. This manipulation misleads investors by 
providing them with more favourable pre-IPO accounting and financial results: an 
overestimation of the pre-IPO operating performance, followed by an underestimation post-
IPO. 
From a practical point of view, window dressing depends on the discretion of managers in 
preparing financial statements and can be implemented in several ways. For instance, these are: 
reporting earnings from other periods by deferring expenditures in R&D; capitalising instead 
of expensing current costs; allocating costs over longer periods by means of straight line 
                                                 
38 The stock market and industry conditions are found to be the two most important determinants of 
IPOs’ timing. The idea is the following: in prosperous periods for the industry, when market valuations 
are high, companies exploit the favourable timing by issuing public offers. 
39 When comparable firms are characterised by high multiples, IPO valuations are positively affected by 
such multiples (IPO companies are able to attain high valuations and offering prices). For this reason, 
private companies are incentivised to go public under these conditions. 
40 Data (Brau and Fawcett, 2006) confirm that CFOs exploit the so-called ‘windows of opportunity’. 
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depreciation, rather than through accelerated depreciation. In this respect, it is useful to note 
that earnings management involved in the window dressing hypothesis is not applicable to cash 
flows. Hence, the lack of a decline in cash flow profitability, coupled with underperformance 
of accrual-based measures of operating performance, could signal a manipulation of earnings 
(Paleari et al., 2008). 
Thus, this creative accounting, which relies on discretionally managing accruals and other 
accounting numbers to make the firm shine, is ultimately implemented to achieve the managers’ 
best interests. 
3. Finally yet importantly, the decline in performance could be explained by an increase in 
agency costs after the public offer. In other words, a partial explanation of the worsening of a 
company's operating performance is to be identified in a change of incentives, which is due to 
a lower concentration of ownership in the post-IPO period. Therefore, conflicts of interests and 
information asymmetries emerge and, following an IPO, increase. Information asymmetries 
take the form of moral hazard and adverse selection. 
In general, the management is delegated to experts (agents) because shareholders (principals) 
do not possess the skills, information and time necessary to run the firm. Moral hazard 
incentivizes managers to run the business to their personal advantage (taking suboptimal 
decisions in order to maximise their own benefits) and to the minority shareholders’ detriment, 
resulting in increased agency costs. In this respect, an IPO may enlarge agency problems even 
more because of the dispersion of managerial ownership. It is documented in literature that 
companies with a low level of post-IPO ownership of managers experience a drop in their 
performance and this drop in performance is the more relevant the lower the share of ownership. 
Conversely, high post-IPO managerial ownership incentivizes managers to undertake value-
maximising projects. 
On the other hand, adverse selection causes companies to go public at the peak of their 
performance, right when profitability is about to begin to fall. Then, adverse selection implies 
a positive correlation between the stake retained by pre-IPO owners and post-IPO operating 
performance. The adverse selection problem occurs due to the information asymmetry existing 
between issuers and investors (issuers possess an informational advantage over new investors), 
and this phenomenon could play a role in the decline of the operating performance and 
adversely affect the success of the IPO (Pagano et al., 1998). In this regard, it seems that the 
most disadvantaged firms are younger, smaller and less known. 
In conclusion, post-listing operating underperformance is not generated solely by one of the 
three hypotheses mentioned above. One hypothesis does not exclude the others, they are not 
mutually exclusive. Indeed, some authors privilege one explanation and disfavour another, but 
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all three have raised in literature equal attention of researchers, since all three are equally valid 
and plausible. Therefore, it is difficult to know if one of the three, in particular, is the 
determinant cause of underperformance. 
Some studies have mentioned potential reasons for underperformance in absence of artefacts. 
For instance, poor post-issue operating performance could be attributed to a decline in the 
profitability of the industry in question and to the absence of revenue growth opportunities, or 
could be explained by IPO-specific conditions. More specifically, reasons for post-IPO 
underperformance could be linked to: the real investment effects of going public; the inefficient 
use of the proceeds deriving from listing; the lack of ability to generate the pre-listing levels of 
positive net present value projects and to manage growth; the post-listing reduction in capital 
expenditures below the adequate level (Jain and Kini, 1994; Kim et al., 2004; Chemmanur et 
al., 2005; Akhigbe et al., 2006). 
However, these further reasons are not widely supported and the other three prevail instead. 
 
Theory attributes numerous virtues to capital markets, the most important of which is increasing 
the sources of financing and, therefore, the opportunities of growth for listed firms. Also, the 
stock exchange performs specific functions like risk diversification and the transfer of control, 
which indirectly promote efficient resource allocation and growth. 
The effects of listing derive from a greater visibility of the listed company and can be of 
opposite sign. On the one hand, visibility translates into increased scrutiny and therefore could 
reduce agency costs and improve performance; on the other hand, it could push managers to 
adopt a short-term perspective and maximize variables such as size or accounting profits – to 
maximize the value of shares – at the expense of long-term growth (Aiello and Silipo, 1997; 
Bonaccorsi di Patti, 1999). Thus, some academics view going public as a positive event in the 
firms’ life cycle, while others object to such a decision by pointing out a series of potential 
drawbacks linked to the IPO. 
The above paragraph has explored the various analyses performed in literature on capital 
markets’ effects on the performance of newly-listed companies. In doing so, some pieces of 
research have focused their attention on the comparison between stock exchanges in different 
countries, others on the comparison of listed and non-public companies. Some other studies 
have also investigated the post-IPO changes at the managerial-ownership level. Then, to recap, 






Table 2.1: Literature Review 
   
 Authors Country Quotation Years 
Alexander and Mayer, 1991 UK 1980-1987 
Jain and Kini, 1994 US 1976-1988  
Belcredi and Gualtieri, 1995 Italy 1985-1990 
Aiello and Silipo, 1997 Italy 1992-1995 
Cai and Wei, 1997 Japan 1971-1992 
Mikkelson et al., 1997 US 1980-1983 
Pagano et al., 1998 Italy  1982-1992 
Bonaccorsi di Patti, 1999 Italy 1992-1996 
Cowling et al., 2002 Japan 1995-1996 
Balatbat et al., 2004 Australia 1976-1993 
Kim et al., 2004 Thailand 1987-1993 
Wang, 2005 China  1994-1999  
Carpenter and Rondi, 2006 Italy and US 1977-1997 
Paleari et al., 2008 Italy and UK 1995-2004 
 Source: Personal elaboration  
 
To conclude, the majority of authors seem to witness underperformance of the operating results: 
firms appear to perform poorly following the IPO. The studies presented report a significant 
decline in the post-issue profitability of IPO firms, with respect to their pre-issue level, both 
before and after industry adjustments. No matter whether developed or developing countries 
are considered, such a puzzling regularity seems to persist. In addition, this underperformance 
of IPOs appears to be a global phenomenon. Yet, this result is not necessarily linked to worrying 
firm conditions, such as earning management practices, but could be viewed as the consequence 
of long-term looking growth-enhancing decisions (e.g. investments in R&D). 
 
2.2 Research involving the Alternative Investment Market 
 
As presented in the first part of the chapter, IPOs have widely raised the interest of academics 
and, within this field, a major research effort has been given to main markets. Nevertheless, 
companies that go public on second markets have received relatively little attention from the 
empirical literature; in fact, studies involving second markets and in particular the post-listing 
effects of IPOs made on second markets are less frequent. The following pages aim to provide 
an overview of the scarce literature dealing with second markets and, for the sake of my 




To begin with, it is worth recalling that second markets are usually arranged to satisfy the 
financing needs of specific classes of firms that do not meet the eligibility requirements of main 
markets (Paleari et al., 2012). Thanks to a less stringent regulatory regime, second markets have 
attracted a growing number of companies, thus their success is testified by data. For instance, 
in the years 1995-2009, out of the 3755 IPOs made on the stock exchanges of the four largest 
European economies (Germany, UK, France and Italy), 2910 IPOs were made on second 
markets. 
Indeed, most stock exchanges are structured into segments: a main market and one (or more) 
second markets. Paleari et al. (2012) describe three models for second markets: the sequential 
segmentation model, the sectorial segmentation model and the demand-side segmentation 
model. 
According to the sequential segmentation model, the second market provides SMEs with the 
funds necessary to grow and is a feeder to the main market (because whenever SMEs are 
successful, they transfer to the main market). This kind of second market was successful in the 
nineties and an Italian real-world example was represented by the Mercato Ristretto. 
Secondly, the sectorial segmentation model applies to the New Markets emerging in the late-
nineties and granting admission only to firms in the high-tech industry. This type of markets, 
such as the Italian Nuovo Mercato, was closed after the crash of the internet bubble. 
The demand-side segmentation model for second markets is the most successful and is linked 
to AIM. Markets within this segmentation model are exchange-regulated markets, meaning that 
they are unregulated or not officially regulated. In exchange-regulated markets, when the IPO 
does not take the form of a public offering but is instead meant for institutional buyers, the 
company’s prospectus is not required nor it must be approved by national listing authorities. 
Hence, minimal regulatory requirements and independence from national listing authorities 
enables companies to list within a limited period of time. 
 
It is intuitively clear that the main market and second markets attract companies with differing 
characteristics. 
Generally, firms going public on second markets are smaller and younger; but this statement 
must not be accepted as an absolute truth because differences exist on the base of the models 
for second markets. Yet, the previous statement holds if a comparison is made between firms 
listing on exchange-regulated markets versus the main market. In fact, Paleari et al. (2012) 
present the descriptive statistics, by listing market, of a sample of European companies at IPO: 
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IPO firms on the exchange-regulated market of Borsa Italiana appear to be smaller in size of 
sales and assets and younger than their counterparts on the Italian main market41. 
Khurshed et al. (2003) and Doukas and Hoque (2016) analyse IPO firms in the UK, comparing 
AIM UK to the Official List of the London Stock Exchange, and come up with similar findings: 
firms listing on the AIM are smaller, younger and less profitable42, despite the firms’ industry 
classification in the two markets being uniformly distributed. 
Prior to the IPO, the two classes of firms register close debt ratios – long and short term debt 
over total assets – and firms on the main market invest more, in terms of capital expenditures 
over total assets (Khurshed et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, the pre-IPO ownership level is similar in the two markets, with around three 
quarters of the pre-IPO equity held by the top four stockholders. However, ownership varies 
significantly in the post-IPO period: while the control of firms listed on the AIM is maintained 
in the hands of the existing shareholders by retaining the majority of shares, the ownership level 
of companies going public on the Official List is subject to a higher degree of dilution43 
(Khurshed et al., 2003).  
 
The AIM and the main market address to some particular categories of firms with differing 
characteristics (e.g. size, age, profitability) and dissimilarities in their post-IPO financing and 
investment priorities. Not surprisingly, the motives that drive the decision of listing on one 
market or on the other are influenced by firms’ characteristics44, thus vary significantly between 
the two markets. 
Firstly, nearly half of the firms45 quoted on AIM UK would meet the necessary requirements 
for listing on the main market (Doukas and Hoque, 2016): thus, the choice of the stock exchange 
does not uniquely depend on the listing regulatory requirements. 
According to Khurshed et al. (2003), the determinants of the going-public decision are inferred 
from the capital expenditure behaviour post-listing: in the case of AIM, capital expenditures46 
                                                 
41 Data of IPO firms on the exchange-regulated market versus the main market of Borsa Italiana are the 
following: median sales (€million) 16.7 vs 147.6; median assets (€million) 28.9 vs 162.5; median age 
(years) 12 vs 31. 
42 Doukas and Hoque (2016) report that companies registering higher sales or higher profitability have 
a lower probability of listing on the AIM. Profitability measures considered by Khurshed et al. (2003) 
are the following: ROA, CFROA, ROE and ROS. 
43 Existing shareholders divest more on the main market than on AIM, potentially losing the control of 
the IPO firms: the ownership level of companies going public on the Official List falls by about 34%. 
44 AIM companies are not suited for the main market because they have different characteristics; in the 
same way, companies on the Official List are not suited for the AIM (Doukas and Hoque, 2016). 
45 In the years 1995-2014, 49.5% of the 1143 IPOs made on the AIM could go public on the main market. 
46 Measured as capital expenditures over total assets. 
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increase after the IPO – on the contrary, the opposite occurs on the Official List. Consequently, 
the AIM appears as a means to raise further funds to finance firms’ capital needs, valuable new 
investments and growth, at a lower cost. Indeed, the AIM’s lower admission, on-going and 
issuance costs also contribute to the decision of smaller and younger firms to list on AIM. On 
the other hand, going public on the Official List is conceived as a manner to rebalance the 
capital structure of companies. In addition, since firms on the main market are frequently 
engaged in M&A activities post-listing, the Official List attracts companies aiming to create 
liquid shares to be used in future acquisitions (Doukas and Hoque, 2016). 
Finally, as previously mentioned, companies on the AIM are characterised by a higher 
ownership concentration; so also control considerations could play a relevant role for small and 
young firms in the decision of going or not going public on the main market (Doukas and 
Hoque, 2016). 
 
A central issue concerns the effects of going public on a second market, and in particular on the 
AIM. Although considerable research effort has been given to the post-listing effects of IPOs 
made on main markets (view paragraph 2.1), less attention has been paid to the performance of 
firms newly-listed on a second market. In fact, literature studying second market IPOs and their 
impact on corporate performance is not frequent. The findings of such studies, despite not being 
numerous, are presented below: they are worthy of mention because they provide some theory 
and interesting food for thought, for the analysis conducted in Chapter 3. 
 
Firstly, Paleari et al. (2012) study the post-listing performance of IPO firms in relation to stock 
price dynamics. Adopting a market approach, a poor long-run stock price performance of 
second market IPOs and an even worse performance of exchange regulated market IPOs is 
reported. In particular, a significantly poor performance of AIM UK IPOs compared to the IPOs 
on the LSE’s Official List is registered47. Such outcome can be explained by investors’ 
scepticism about returns to be expected from companies listed on markets with a less stringent 
regulatory regime. 
 
However, in practice, the delisting rates registered on second markets are not much different 
from those registered on the main market: the probability to delist differs mostly between two 
                                                 
47 The stock price performance is measured in terms of the buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Paleari et al. 
(2012) point out a three-year average buy-and-hold abnormal return for second market IPOs and main 
market IPOs of -19% and +12.3%, respectively. In particular, as for the LSE, the three-year average 




different countries rather than between market segments (Paleari et al., 2012). For instance, the 
delisting rate is lower in Continental Europe – in Italy (27.1%) and Germany (25.2%) – than in 
the UK (52%); this might be due to differences48 in the regulatory regimes and to the different 
nature and characteristics of firms listing in Continental Europe, if compared to firms listing in 
the UK. 
Similar results on the survival profile of IPO firms are highlighted by Nielsson (2013) and 
Revest and Sapio (2014). In the period 1995-2004, 10.7% of the quoted firms delisted from 
AIM UK within five years from the IPO, for voluntary or administrative reasons49. The authors 
also report that larger and older companies supervised by reputable Nomads show even lower 
failure rates; in fact, a Nomad's good reputation influences the survival rate of businesses, 
increasing such rate by two years on average. Ultimately, the authors claim that the delisting 
pattern across markets is similar, thus suggesting that the failure rate of AIM firms is not higher 
than the one of firms listed on a more regulated market.  
In contrast, the above-mentioned findings differ from the conclusions of Gerakos et al. (2013), 
who study the survival rate of companies listed on AIM and compare it with that of similar 
companies on the main list of the LSE in the UK and on the NASDAQ and the Over-The-
Counter-The Bulletin Board (OTCBB) in the US. The paper states that the time intercurring 
between starting the business and bankruptcy is 60% shorter for AIM companies than for 
companies in the other markets: in other words, the failure rate of companies listed on AIM 
appears to be higher than that of comparable companies listed on other markets. Yet, even if 
AIM firms seem to be more likely to fail, the failure rate can be mitigated by the presence of 
competent Nomads. 
 
Along with studies on the stock price dynamics or survival profile of second market IPOs, 
scholars also focus on the corporate performance of IPO firms. In this respect, Khurshed et al. 
(2003) investigate the post-listing operating performance of UK IPOs. The firms quoted on the 
Official List appear not to be able to guarantee the same profitability level of the pre-IPO period, 
hence the deterioration in their post-listing performance is confirmed – in line with the research 
presented in paragraph 2.1. Whereas, this pattern is not highlighted for the firms quoted on the 
AIM: while a significant decline, in terms of ROA and ROE, is experienced after the IPO by 
companies going public on the Official List, a positive increase of these performance measures 
characterises the AIM. Also, a similar trend emerges from the analysis of the effects of going 
                                                 
48 Delisting in Continental Europe is more difficult and expensive. Firms listing in Continental Europe 
are larger and older.  
49 E.g. bankruptcy; failure to comply with the listing requirements. 
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public on asset turnover. Therefore, a very interesting finding comes to light from this paper: 
the AIM is the first market recording no evidence of a declining post-listing operating 
performance. 
Moreover, listing on the AIM does not immediately affect the leverage, which instead increases 
three years after the issue (Khurshed et al., 2003). While on the contrary, listing on the main 
market results in a permanent drop in leverage, since the IPO brings about a permanent decrease 
of the debt exposure (i.e. a rebalancing of the capital structure). 
However, the view that going public on the AIM is exploited by firms as a launch pad for 
growth, without having to give up on profitability, is not shared by Doukas and Hoque (2016), 
who find AIM UK firms to be loss-making. The authors report a poor post-listing operating 
performance of AIM firms50 and a positive post-listing operating performance of firms going 
public on the Official List51. Also, the operating performance of AIM firms, both meeting or 
not meeting the listing requirements of the main market, is characterised by high variability. 
Hence, AIM IPOs seem to have an inferior operating performance than main market IPOs. In 
addition, Doukas and Hoque (2016) present a curious finding: the performance of AIM firms 
would not be better, had they decided to list on the main market instead52. No matter where the 
listing, the performance of AIM firms would still be lower than the performance of companies 
listed on the main market. 
This idea that AIM companies underperform their counterparts on the main market is not 
infrequent in literature. Gerakos et al. (2013), comparing companies on the AIM UK and on the 
main markets of the UK and US, reveal not very encouraging results about the economic 
performance of these companies: in the period 1995-2008, the performance of AIM UK 
companies is lower than that of companies listed on the other markets. In general, AIM 
companies perform poorly, underperforming their counterparts on traditional exchanges by 
about 13% and 30% on the first and second year subsequent to the IPO53 (Piotroski, 2013). 
These outcomes are robust to controls for differences in growth, profitability and investment 
opportunities. 
Given such a striking economically substantial underperformance of the companies going 
public on the AIM, the AIM seems to be a ‘landing pad for struggling firms’ rather than a 
                                                 
50 AIM firms which do meet the listing requirements of the main market are considered in the analysis. 
51 The authors compute an average three-year post-listing operating performance of -19.9% and +7.33%. 
52 This statement is almost always likely to be true also for the AIM firms meeting the Official List’s 
more stringent regulatory regime. 
53 In particular, the authors also find out that AIM companies that raise capital during the listing process 
underperform by a larger magnitude (by between 10 and 17 percentage points) other AIM and main 
market companies that do not raise capital. 
54 
 
‘launching pad for highfliers’. Yet, Gerakos et al. (2013) suggest that the underperformance 
can partially be attenuated thanks to the effective oversight of high-quality auditors and 
Nomads. Hence, especially for AIM firms (or in cases of limited regulatory supervision), the 
adoption of a big-554 auditor and of a Nomad characterised by a positive-performance prior 
experience is of significant relevance. 
Furthermore, Piotroski (2013) proposes that such post-listing underperformance can partly be 
explained by the discretionary accruals of the IPO period. The study documents extremely high 
pre-listing accruals – to inflate earnings – and post-listing reversals of AIM firms, if compared 
to the same figures of non-AIM firms. Thus suggesting that, because of the flexible regulatory 
requirements and limited oversight, AIM firms are more likely to manage discretionary accruals 
(by increasing them prior to listing, which results into larger reversals after the IPO). Accruals 
management or lower quality earnings are in this case related to the post-listing 
underperformance. Additionally, according to Nielsson (2013), underperformance is not due to 
a lower quality of the listings taking place on the AIM. The author states that AIM firms are of 
the same quality of firms listed on the leading stock exchanges of Continental Europe or the 
US: AIM companies are indeed smaller in size, but are comparable in terms of profitability to 
firms listing on other markets. Then, the paper suggests that differences in the post-listing 
performance are not to be attributed to differences in the ex-ante quality of the firms listing on 
AIM, and that more stringent regulatory requirements are not necessary to attract higher 
quality55 companies. 
 
Last but not least, Revest and Sapio (2014) address a further dimension of AIM's impact on 
businesses, that is actual performance. Few empirical studies deal with the impact of AIM on 
the actual performance of listed companies – where, for actual performance, dimensional and 
productivity growth are intended. 
In the UK, differences between the growth rates of companies listed on the AIM and of similar 
unlisted firms are found to exist. The presence of intangible assets together with the CEO's level 
of education and experience positively influence the growth rate of listed companies and are 
significant determinants of companies’ post-listing performance. Also, the reputable Nomads’ 
offering of effective support to firms listed on the AIM results in an increase in the company 
size. While, on the one hand, an overall positive influence of the AIM on company size is 
                                                 
54 One of the five largest international auditing firms. 
55 A high quality firm is to be intended as a company characterised by high growth, high market valuation 
and low leverage. 
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reported, on the other hand, the productivity growth (e.g. value added per employee) of AIM-
listed companies is slower (-20.7%) than that of private companies. 
Therefore, a good performance in terms of growth rate is mitigated by an underperformance in 
terms of productivity: listing on AIM positively affects the growth in size of the company, but 
an absence of AIM’s effects on productivity growth is revealed. 
 
In conclusion, research involving the AIM and the post-listing effects of IPOs made on the AIM 
does not always provide consistent results. Both positive and negative factors emerge from the 
analysis made in this paragraph, and while going public on the AIM is a stepping-stone to 
growth for some scholars, for others going public on the AIM is more than risky. In addition, 
literature on AIM is not free from questions left unanswered. Today, an open debate concerns 
the trade-off between the dimensional growth of AIM and the average quality of AIM-listed 
companies (Revest and Sapio, 2011). In fact, as the AIM’s market model spreads, critics fear 
that the rapid dimensional growth of AIM could be attained at the expense of the quality of the 
listed firms, putting at risk the market’s long-term stability. 
 
2.3 Bridging the Gap 
 
AIM’s success is undoubtful. Its attractiveness can be associated to the fact that it enables 
companies to raise capital at a lower cost. Joining the AIM is not seen as a standard stage in the 
business life cycle but as an alternative and complementary mode of funding, which does not 
require being a mature business in order to be granted access to the financial market, vis-à-vis 
other more costly sources of financing. In the years 1995–2009, second markets have attracted 
an increasing number of companies: 77.5% of IPOs occurred on the second markets of the four 
largest European economies. In the same years, market transfers in the London Stock Exchange 
have been numerous: 282 firms transferred from the Official List of the LSE to AIM UK while 
only 90 firms moved in the opposite direction (Paleari et al., 2012). Then, the substantial growth 
in the number of listings on second markets, if compared to main markets, testifies the growing 
popularity of AIM. Also, the frequent transfers56 from the LSE’s Official List and a net flow of 
switching firms leaning greatly towards AIM UK, attests the rising success of the AIM. 
AIM UK has never stopped growing and developing, thus representing an indisputable proof 
of resilience. It is one of the most popular second markets in the world and a point of reference 
                                                 
56 Often cited reasons for transferring towards the AIM are related to the lower costs, higher flexibility 
and less stringent regulatory requirements associated to this segment. In this respect, the choice of 
switching market may be driven by changes in the characteristics of the company itself or even by 
changes in the attributes of the market in question. 
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for the youngest second markets dedicated to SMEs. In fact, the success gained by AIM UK 
has made this market a source of inspiration for other stock exchanges that have imitated and 
replicated the AIM model, creating for instance two ‘copies’ of AIM (AIM Japan and AIM 
Italia). Given its rising success, the unique and interesting setting provided by AIM is worthy 
of study. 
 
The second chapter has focused on analysing the existing literature on IPOs, with a particular 
insight into the post-listing effects. The evaluation of the corporate performance of IPO firms, 
which is especially important for shareholders, is found to be a challenging issue. Yet, the 
relevance of this topic has fostered various studies that evaluate the operating performance of 
newly listed companies, relying on accounting-based measures and examining the IPO’s effects 
on performance with respect to pre- and post-IPO periods. Such analyses adopt statistical tests 
or econometric models in order to assess the presence of any variation in the post-listing 
operating performance. However, the great majority of these studies are conducted on IPOs that 
involve main markets (view paragraph 2.1) and only a minor part is on IPOs that involve the 
AIM (view paragraph 2.2). 
The reason behind the lack of literature concerning second markets (including AIM) could be 
linked to the fact that finding data for small companies is generally more problematic. Hence, 
the smaller size of firms, which quote on second markets or on the AIM, makes analyses more 
difficult: it is because of this scarce empirical literature that the first part of this chapter has 
dealt with main markets. In addition, it is worth noting that the research on second markets 
presented in the second part of this chapter does not consider AIM Italia. The studies mentioned 
so far only regard AIM UK, the reference point for the foundation of AIM Italia. Then, it must 
be interesting to observe what happens in the Italian market, since, in this respect, no theoretical 
clue is present. For this reason, the next pages build on the gap that characterizes the analysis 
of the effects of AIM Italia on the performance of SMEs, with the aim to assess whether 
accessing AIM Italia offers benefits to the companies. 
Is there a beneficial impact of listing on AIM Italia? What is the post-listing performance of 
companies newly-listed on AIM Italia? Do AIM-listed firms perform better if compared to their 
non-listed peers? These are some of the questions addressed – through the analysis of financial 
statements and, in particular, of data attributable to size, growth, financial structure, profitability 
– in Chapter 3. Surely, it is not clear what the answers to the above questions will be: it seems 
difficult to make any expectation57, since researches on AIM Italia are lacking. 
                                                 
57 The theory focuses on main markets or, sometimes, on AIM UK. Making inferences for AIM Italia 
(from such theory) is likely to provide incorrect outcomes. In fact, the unique setting of AIM Italia, the 
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In conclusion, while Chapter 1 has introduced AIM Italia, Chapter 2 has given an overview of 
the literature on IPOs trying to provide a theoretical basis for the analysis performed in Chapter 
3. To the best of my knowledge, no study focuses on the post-quotation performance of 
companies listed on AIM Italia; hence, Chapter 3 aims to bridge this gap in literature. Bearing 
in mind the knowledge gained in the first two chapters, I propose to close this gap by comparing 
the performance of firms that decided to go public on AIM Italia with that of comparable firms 
that decided to stay private. 
Given the relevance of SMEs in the Italian economy, it is important to close this gap because 
in this way it is possible to understand whether it is worth for SMEs to list on AIM Italia. In 
other words, this analysis must be conducted for all those SMEs that are considering going 
public in Italy, and for those that will consider doing so in the future. 
  
                                                 
market sentiment and other country-specific features presumably affect companies listing on AIM Italia 
differently. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that any theory explored in Chapter 2 cannot be directly 

















EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LISTING ON 
AIM ITALIA 
 
3.1 Research question: the purpose of the research 
 
What is the post-listing performance of companies newly listed on AIM Italia? Do AIM-listed 
firms perform better if compared to their non-listed peers? This is the research question I aim 
to address through the analysis conducted in Chapter 3. In other words, understanding whether 
listing on AIM offers benefits to companies is the purpose of my dissertation thesis. 
 
Surely, it seems difficult to make any expectation about what the answer to the above question 
will be, since researches on AIM Italia are lacking. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, theoretical uncertainty generally characterises the analyses of 
capital markets’ effects on corporate performance and the major research effort has been given 
to main markets. Instead, companies that go public on second markets have received a minor 
attention from the empirical literature; in fact, papers involving second markets and their impact 
on corporate performance are less frequent. 
Thus, it is not easy to find in literature studies involving the effects of listing on AIM. Actually, 
to the best of my knowledge, no empirical paper focuses on the post-quotation performance of 
companies listed on AIM Italia. The reason behind the lack of literature concerning second 
markets (including AIM) is linked to the fact that finding data for smaller-sized companies is 
generally more problematic, making analyses more cumbersome. So, through my research I 
want to bridge this gap in literature. 
 
It is worth to recall that AIM’s success is undoubtful: AIM UK is one of the most popular 
second markets in the world and represents a source of inspiration for the youngest second 
markets dedicated to SMEs, such as AIM Italia. 
Above all, the substantial growth in the number of listings – if compared to main markets – 
testifies the growing popularity of AIM. Its rising attractiveness can be associated to the 
market’s essence: being an alternative and complementary mode of funding, thus enabling 
companies to raise capital at a lower cost. Consequently, given its rising success, the unique 
and interesting setting provided by AIM is worthy of study. 
 




1) to the best of my knowledge, no empirical studies focusing on the post-listing 
performance of companies concentrate exclusively on the AIM Italia; 
2) the listing of SMEs on AIM Italia is a relatively recent and growing phenomenon, 
aiming to enhance SMEs’ growth opportunities by providing an alternative source of 
financing; 
3) the relevance of SMEs within the Italian economy. 
It is necessary to close the existing gap in literature in order to understand whether it is worth 
for SMEs to list on AIM Italia. More specifically, it is important to conduct this analysis for all 
those SMEs that are considering going public, and for those that will consider doing so in the 
future. 
The next pages illustrate the gap that characterises the analysis of the effects of AIM Italia on 
the performance of SMEs, with the aim to assess whether accessing AIM Italia offers benefits 
to the companies. 
 
3.2 The method: data, sample, variables 
 
Bearing in mind the knowledge gained in the first two chapters, I suggest bridging the above-
mentioned gap in literature by comparing the performance of firms that decided to go public on 
AIM Italia with that of comparable firms that continued to stay private. More specifically, to 
understand whether listing on AIM offers benefits to companies, I have selected a sample of 
AIM-listed companies and have identified a number of non-listed firms that were comparable 
pre-quotation. Afterwards, I have detected if, in the post-listing period, significant differences 
in corporate performance exist between the AIM-listed firms and their respective peers. 
The solution I propose to close the gap is not completely innovative because some pieces of 
research, like Belcredi and Gualtieri (1995) or Aiello and Silipo (1997), have already focused 
their attention on the comparison between listed and non-public companies. However, although 
an approach similar to mine has been adopted in literature, I have still been implementing 
something new because this technique has never been used before for AIM Italia. 
Yet, it is worth to note the main issue related to answering my research question: since 
information disclosure for SMEs is limited, the problem of missing data is likely to emerge. 
The risk of having to deal with the problem of missing data represents the reason why empirical 
studies in literature tend to focus on listed larger-sized firms rather than on SMEs. In fact, 
finding data for smaller-sized companies is generally more problematic and adds a degree of 
complexity to the analysis; consequently, a series of assumptions – listed in the following pages 




Before presenting the findings of my research in the next paragraphs, I provide below the details 
concerning the ‘preparation phase’ of the analysis: 
 Data source & data elaboration; 
 Sample definition; 
 Selected variables. 
 
3.2.1 Data source & data elaboration 
 
Data has been collected on the AIDA58 platform, which is a database containing economic-
financial, personal and commercial information of all joint-stock companies operating in Italy. 
For the analysis59 of the dataset, of the single variables and of the relation between variables, 
the R software (a software for statistical computing and graphics), together with Excel, have 
been used. 
 
3.2.2 Sample definition 
 
During the sample definition process a series of assumptions have been made; such assumptions 
have been necessary to deal with information gaps. In fact, not surprisingly, the above-
mentioned problem has emerged: the consideration of non-listed SMEs implies limited 
information availability. 
Before looking for non-listed peer companies, I have identified the optimal way to make the 
comparison between AIM-listed firms and their peers. In this respect, the use of statutory 
financial statements has been made fundamental. 
 
Why are statutory financial statements the optimal choice? 
I have tried to consider consolidated financial statements before resorting to the use of statutory 
financial statements. However, while all AIM-listed firms (including subholdings) that are part 
of a group release consolidated financial data, the same is generally not true for their non-listed 
counterparts. Consequently, since non-listed ultimate owners and controlled subsidiaries lack 
consolidated financial data, it is not possible to make the comparison between listed and non-
listed firms based on consolidated financial statements. 
I have then examined the option of making a comparison between the consolidated data (of 
AIM-listed firms) and the statutory data (for non-listed SMEs). Such possibility would have 
                                                 
58 Data source: AIDA (Analisi Informatizzata delle Aziende Italiane) – Bureau van Dijk. 
59 Data elaboration: R and Microsoft Excel. 
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contemplated the selection of only ‘single’ companies (not part of a group or without majority 
shareholdings) as comparables, in order to use truthful statutory data and avoid distortions. Yet, 
intuitively, an AIM-listed company belonging to a group is in no way comparable to a SME not 
belonging to a group. Therefore, also the consolidated-statutory comparison has been excluded. 
Finally, a third alternative regards the utilisation of just statutory financial statements, for both 
public and private companies. This third option has been deemed the optimal one since it 
overcomes any distortion deriving from the consolidated-statutory comparison. Moreover, the 
use of statutory financial statements is nothing new: in literature, Belcredi and Gualtieri (1995), 
Pagano et al. (1996) and Bonaccorsi di Patti (1999) have all conducted empirical analyses by 
relying on statutory data. 
Furthermore, the use of statutory financial statements must be accompanied by an ‘evaluation 
of relevance’. In other words, it is necessary to construct a sample made up of companies whose 
statutory financial statements are meaningful; for such companies, statutory data are significant 
if compared to consolidated data – the weight of the statutory statements on the consolidated 
ones is high – so that the use of consolidated financial statements is not required. This 
assumption is explained in more detail below. 
 
To begin with, the composition of the sample can be summarised under three categories: 
 CASE 1: single/independent firm; 
 CASE 2: global ultimate owner of the corporate group; 
 CASE 3: controlled subsidiary. 
CASE 1 represents the simplest firm-typology. In fact, the statutory financial statement is fully 
informative for companies that are single/independent, thus not belonging to a corporate group. 
Under this particular circumstance, no issue emerges and no ‘evaluation of relevance’ is 
required. 
Instead, an ‘evaluation of relevance’ is necessary when dealing with CASE 2 and CASE 3. 
Global ultimate owners and controlled subsidiaries are part of a corporate group, hence, in 
theory, consolidated financial statements should be examined when considering this kind of 
firms. However, as already stated, the use of consolidated data is not feasible. Consequently, to 
correctly use statutory data, I have resorted to an assumption: the ‘evaluation of relevance’. 
 
How does the ‘evaluation of relevance’ assumption work? 
To understand whether a company belonging to a group is operating, I have computed the 
relevance of the company’s statutory financial statement with respect to the economic-financial 
position of the group. Once a relevance threshold is surpassed, using the statutory financial 
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statement is conceptually right even if the company in question is part of a group; conversely, 
once a relevance threshold is not surpassed, using the statutory financial statement is not 
conceptually right and it is better to exclude the company in question because not operating. 
I have set the relevance threshold equal to 70%, and exceptions to meeting such level of 
relevance have been examined one by one. For instance, in a couple of cases, for companies 
belonging to a numerous corporate group (i.e. more than 15 companies in the group), I have 
decided to lower the threshold to 60%. In this way, I have included within the sample firms that 
would have otherwise been excluded, but that, in my opinion, are visibly operating and play a 
relevant position within their group. 
To better understand the reasoning behind the ‘evaluation of relevance’ assumption, Table 3.1 
reports an example. 




Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Three dimensions have been considered for the ‘evaluation of relevance’: revenues, total assets 
and shareholders' equity. I have calculated the share of the company’s revenues on the group’s 
revenues, the share of the company’s assets on the group’s assets and the share of the company’s 
equity on the group’s equity. Such computation has been conducted before including the firms 
in the sample, to get an indication on the reliability of their statutory financial statements. 
Thus, the aim of ‘evaluation of relevance’ assumption is to verify how much the company 
weighs within the group. If it weighs very little, studying its statutory data makes no sense 
because the statutory financial statement is not representative of the business in question. 
Otherwise, I can work with the company’s statutory financial statements because they are 
informative and significant. 
 
NAME TYPE FS
T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3
Statutory 47,910,000 51,037,000 53,493,000 59,692,000 60,699,000 60,544,000
Consolidated 60,528,000 60,433,000 62,621,000 71,378,000 71,617,000 67,405,000
% ON GROUP 79.15% 84.45% 85.42% 83.63% 84.76% 89.82%
GIORGIO FEDON & FIGLI S.P.A. 2014
SALES
NAME TYPE FS
T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3
Statutory 41,603,000 40,844,000 48,796,000 47,677,000 51,123,000 52,518,000
Consolidated 45,178,000 45,250,000 55,622,000 55,753,000 58,565,000 56,782,000
% ON GROUP 92.09% 90.26% 87.73% 85.51% 87.29% 92.49%
GIORGIO FEDON & FIGLI S.P.A. 2014
ASSETS
NAME TYPE FS
T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3
Statutory 13,045,000 13,872,000 12,587,000 13,464,000 13,146,000 10,702,000
Consolidated 15,691,000 16,780,000 17,416,000 18,857,000 19,571,000 14,659,000
% ON GROUP 83.14% 82.67% 72.27% 71.40% 67.17% 73.01%




Now that the main underlying assumption is clear, here are further details that have led to the 
sample definition. 
In particular, the final sample has been identified by following two steps: 
 STEP 1: selection of AIM-listed companies; 
 STEP 2: identification of non-listed peer companies. 
 
STEP 1: identification of AIM-listed companies 
A list of the assumptions that I have formulated to select the listed subsample follows. 
-AIM-listed firms that went public in the years 2010-2016 have been considered. This particular 
time frame of IPOs has been chosen in order to observe financial results for at least 2 years 
post-quotation. In fact, the empirical analysis refers to data for the quotation year (t) and for the 
three post-listing years (t+1, t+2, t+3), but for AIM-listed companies that went public in 2016, 
financial data has been retrieved only60 for 2016, 2017, 2018 (t, t+1, t+2). 
-Only Italian companies have been considered. Foreign companies have been excluded from 
the sample. 
-By conducting the ‘evaluation of relevance’, only operating companies have been included 
(any non-operating ultimate owner/controlled subsidiary has not been taken in account). 
-AIM-listed subsidiaries controlled by listed companies have been excluded from the sample 
because being controlled by a listed company, for the sake of the analysis, could represent a 
distortion. 
-The effect of delistings has not been taken in consideration: all the firms inspected were listed 
on AIM on the 31/12/2019. 
-Any firm whose IPO was characterised by the intervention of a SPAC (Special Purpose 
Acquisition Company) has been excluded from the sample. 
As a result, the final listed subsample consists of 33 companies. 
 
STEP 2: identification of non-listed peer companies 
The identification of peers for the 33 AIM-listed companies has been conducted by using 
AIDA. 
I have initially considered the possibility of adopting the propensity score matching method to 
statistically match each AIM-listed company with a group of comparable companies. However, 
because of the lack of consolidated financial data and, therefore, the need of assessing the 
                                                 
60 Financial statements for the year 2019 were not available when data has been collected (15/05/2020). 
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relevance of each statutory financial statement (to make the statutory-statutory comparison), 
the use of propensity score matching has not been possible. 
Hence, I have manually identified firms that were similar – in the pre-quotation period – to the 
33 AIM-listed companies. The comparability has been evaluated on the base of industry, size, 
profitability and governance structure. 
First of all, AIDA has facilitated the selection of comparables thanks to data filtering. As shown 
in the example in Figure 3.1, the following filters have been set: 
-the peer company must be non-listed; 
-the peer’s Ateco 2007 industry code must coincide with that of the respective AIM-listed 
company; 
-the peer’s size, in terms of revenues and assets, must coincide with that of the respective AIM-
listed company; 
-the profitability condition of the peer must be comparable to that of the respective AIM-listed 
company (i.e. profit-making or loss-making). 
 
Figure 3.1: Peer identification – an example 
 
Source: AIDA – Bureau van Dijk 
 
Afterwards, the results of the data filtering process have been analysed one by one and I have 
chosen the comparable items by looking at their governance structure and by evaluating the 
relevance of their statutory data. 
Additional details and exceptions are described below. In fact, it is worth noting that: 
-All of the above selection criteria have been verified in the years pre-quotation (t-3, t-2, t-1). 
In particular, where possible61, priority has been given to comparability of year t-2, since 
economic-financial data in year t-1 tends to be distorted: not by chance, Jain and Kini (1994) 
and Mikkelson et al. (1997) point out that a higher performance can often be observed in year 
t-1. In addition, considering year t-2 is better also because it allows to contemplate the cases of 
companies listing in the first months of the year: for these companies, year t-1 represents just 
‘a couple of months before’ the quotation date.  
                                                 




-Whenever the Ateco 2007 industry code has led to the selection of a limited number of 
comparable companies, I have also included in the data filtering process AIDA’s so-called 
‘Gruppo dei Pari’ (translated: group of peers). In fact, AIDA classifies each firm according to 
the Ateco 2007 industry code and to the ‘Gruppo dei Pari’. The former is a stricter categorisation 
based on the six units of the Ateco code, the latter is a less stringent categorisation that relies 
on only the first three units of the Ateco code. In this way, I have been able to construct a more 
representative sample, extending the peers’ identification among firms sharing the same activity 
code. 
-As for size filtering, I have relied on the definition of SME. As mentioned in Chapter 1, SMEs 
consist of micro, small and medium enterprises, where each size is determined by a range of 
values for revenues and assets. Hence, I have set my size-filters accordingly. For instance, if 
the AIM-listed company pre-quotation was micro, I have looked for non-listed peers with less 
than €2 million of revenues and assets in the pre-listing period. In the same way, if the AIM-
listed company was small (medium), I have looked for peers with revenues and assets ranging 
between €2 and €10 million (with revenues ranging between €10 and €50 million and assets 
ranging between €10 and €43 million). 
-Generally, I have matched AIM-listed profit-making firms with profit-making comparables, 
and vice versa. This has been possible by extracting firms with the minimum/maximum value 
of the profit/loss measure equal to zero. On top of this, whenever the results of the data filtering 
process have been extremely numerous, I have screened the results by ROA and ROI measures 
and I have then manually selected the companies with the most similar profitability condition. 
-A last clarification regards the assessment of the governance structure. After filtering data in 
AIDA, a final step of the peers’ identification has consisted in examining the status of each 
potential peer. In fact, AIDA provides information about the status, telling whether a firm is 
single, ultimate owner or controlled subsidiary; however, the indicated status is as of today. 
Consequently, I have verified that the current status coincides with that of the pre-quotation 
period: I have checked the M&A information (retrieved in AIDA) to investigate if, in the years 
concerned, there has been any relevant event62 that could question the veracity of the current 
state of companies. I have performed such verification in order to match AIM-listed companies 
with peers characterised by a similar governance structure63. In other words, I have matched 
                                                 
62 Has there been any relevant change in the governance structure? Has the company in question been 
the target of an acquisition? Has the company in question gone public during the reference years? 
63 Whenever such verification has not been possible, a strong assumption has been made: the status 
today coincides with the status in the pre-listing period. This assumption concerns the peer companies 




AIM-listed single companies with single-peers, AIM-listed ultimate owners with ultimate 
owner-peers and AIM-listed controlled subsidiaries with controlled subsidiary-peers. Finally 
yet importantly, I have also checked that the selected peers are not controlled by listed 
companies. 
 
The sample definition process, described in detail in the previous pages, has led to a final sample 
made up of 33 listed companies and 484 comparable firms. The former are present in Table 3.2 
below, while for the list of the entire final sample view Table 3.3 in the Appendix. 
 
Table 3.2: Final listed subsample 
AIM company Quotation year Number of comparables 
FINTEL ENERGIA GROUP S.P.A. 2010 3 
VISIBILIA EDITORE S.P.A. 2010 13 
ROSETTI MARINO S.P.A. 2010 4 
IMVEST S.P.A. 2011 20 
AMBROMOBILIARE S.P.A. 2011 20 
PRISMI S.P.A. 2012 15 
SOFTEC S.P.A. 2012 10 
CDR ADVANCE CAPITAL S.P.A. 2012 20 
ENERTRONICA SANTERNO S.P.A. 2013 16 
LEONE FILM GROUP S.P.A. 2013 14 
DIGITAL MAGICS S.P.A. 2013 14 
WM CAPITAL S.P.A. 2013 20 
COSTAMP GROUP S.P.A. 2014 19 
GIORGIO FEDON & FIGLI SPA 2014 11 
ECOSUNTEK S.P.A. 2014 14 
GRUPPO GREEN POWER S.P.A. 2014 20 
NOTORIOUS PICTURES S.P.A. 2014 20 
GO INTERNET S.P.A 2014 12 
EXPERT SYSTEM S.P.A. 2014 17 
MAILUP S.P.A. 2014 20 
INIZIATIVE BRESCIANE – INBRE – S.P.A. 2014 8 
MASI AGRICOLA S.P.A. 2015 11 
COVER 50 S.P.A. 2015 16 
CLABO SOCIETA’ PER AZIONI 2015 18 
BLUE FINANCIAL COMMUNICATION S.P.A. 2015 17 
H-FARM S.P.A. 2015 15 
ASSITECA S.P.A. 2015 3 
DIGITOUCH S.P.A. 2015 17 
CALEIDO GROUP S.P.A. 2015 18 
SITI – B&T GROUP S.P.A. 2016 16 
ENERGICA MOTOR COMPANY S.P.A. 2016 8 
FOPE S.P.A. 2016 15 
VETRYA S.P.A 2016 20 
Source: Personal elaboration 
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3.2.3 Selected variables 
 
Of course, it is possible to retrieve from AIDA information on hundreds of economic-financial 
variables. Yet, the decision on the variables’ selection has been made by using as reference 
point the empirical literature on IPOs. 
For the sake of my dissertation, I have selected a limited number of variables, which are listed 
in Table 3.4; these represent, in my opinion, the most relevant data to be studied. Also, as 
already mentioned, all the economic-financial variables enumerated below are available for the 
entire time frame of analysis (t, t+1, t+2, t+3). 
 
Table 3.4: Selected variables 
 
General characteristics Size & Growth 
Efficiency & 
Profitability 
Financial structure & 
Liquidity 
Ateco 2007 Revenues Operating expenses Equity 
Region Sales growth Capital intensity Net financial position (NFP) 
Year of constitution Assets Asset turnover Debt/Equity (D/E) 
Number of companies in 
corporate group 
Assets growth Profit or loss Debt/Ebitda 





Return on assets 
(ROA) 
Interest coverage ratio 
Innovative Start-up Intangibles 




Innovative SME  
Return on investment 
(ROI) 
Net working capital (NWC) 
     Current ratio 










3.3 Descriptive statistics64 
 
This paragraph provides a descriptive summary of the sample. For a more detailed analysis and 
discussion of the results please refer to Chapter 4. 
 
As previously mentioned, the total sample consists of 517 observations, where 33 are AIM-
listed companies and the remaining 484 are their respective selected peers. In addition, it is 
worth noting that, for almost half of the sample, year t corresponds to year 2014-2015; in fact, 
almost half of the AIM-listed companies went public during 2014 and 2015 (view Table 3.2). 
 
3.3.1 Pre-listing snapshot 
 
Before focusing on the descriptive analysis of the post-listing period, here is a brief look at the 
pre-listing years. 
By definition, during these years the AIM-listed companies and their peers were comparable. 
Yet, as a double check, it is interesting to illustrate the starting condition of the sample (in the 
years t-3, t-2, t-1). Hence, the comparison between the listed and non-listed subsample is briefly 
presented, just for the variables determining comparability (sector, revenues, assets, profit/loss). 
To begin with, Figure 3.2 displays the bar plots for the Ateco 2007 industry code, considering 
the first three units of the code for simplicity of representation. The slight difference between 
the listed and non-listed subsample is driven by the non-constant number of peers identified for 
each listed company. Table 3.5 in the Appendix provides the legend for each industry code, 

















                                                 
64 All the figures of paragraph 3.3 are Personal elaborations. 
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Figure 3.2: ATECO 2007 industry code 
 
 
The 64% of the listed subsample belongs to the tertiary sector of the economy, while the 
remaining 36% to the secondary sector. In particular, as shown in Figure 3.3, communication 
and manufacturing activities dominate the sample, even if professional/scientific/technical 
services play a relevant role too. 
Figure 3.3: Listed companies by sector 
 
As for size, revenues and assets are to be mentioned. 
Revenues and assets for both listed and non-listed companies are on average slightly lower than 
€20 million in the pre-listing period. Instead, the median value of revenues and assets is around 
€10 million. 
The (log) distribution of revenues and assets is depicted in Figure 3.4b and Figure 3.5b. In this 
respect, I have preferred to apply the logarithmic transformation to reduce the strongly positive 
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asymmetric trend of the distributions (view the distribution of revenues and assets – without 
log – in Figure 3.4a and Figure 3.5a, Appendix). 
 
Figure 3.4b: Revenues (pre) 
 
Figure 3.5b: Assets (pre) 
 
 
Moreover, I have performed the t-test on the size measures to check whether there is a 
significant difference, in revenues and assets, between the AIM-listed companies and their non-
listed counterparts. In both cases, given an error equal to 5%, the P-values indicate that no 
differences in revenues or assets exist between listed and non-listed companies. In fact, as 




Finally, Figure 3.6 compares the profitability histograms of listed and non-listed firms. In this 
case, it has not been possible to apply the logarithmic transformation to the profit/loss 
distribution because the profitability measure can take negative values, making the use of 
logarithm not valid. 
Figure 3.6: Profit/Loss (pre) 
 
 
On average, in the pre-listing period, profits for both listed and non-listed companies are around 
€800 thousands. Instead, the median value of profits is way lower, less than €150 thousands. 
In addition, according to the t-test reported in Table 3.5, the P-value signals no differences in 
terms of profitability between the AIM-listed companies and their peers, given an error equal 
to 5%. The latter represents a borderline case but, still, the P-value is greater than 0.05, so I 
can claim that no significant difference exists. 
 
Table 3.5: T-test of revenues, assets and profit/loss (pre) 
   Two Sample t-test   
 Group 95% confidence interval   
Variable Ipo Yes Ipo No Upper Lower t p-value 
Revenues       
df 515 515 2799.873 -25743.302 -1.5792 0.1149 
Mean 29045.74 17574.03     
Assets       
df 515 515 5116.658 -28004.928 -1.3576 0.1752 
Mean 31762.10 20317.96     
Profit/loss       
df 515 515 8.281519 -1925.952271 -1.9478 0.05199 




3.3.2 Post-listing effects 
 
The above figures testify that the AIM-listed firms and their comparables were similar in the 
pre-listing years: the expectation of not observing relevant differences between the two 
subsamples has been verified and has proven to be true. Hence, this means that I have 
successfully selected the group of peer companies. 
Starting from the assumption that firms were comparable pre-quotation, it just comes natural to 
ask ourselves: what are the effects of listing on AIM Italia? To answer our research question, it 
is necessary to shift the attention to the descriptive analysis of the post-listing period. For the 
sake of the dissertation, examining how the listed and non-listed subsamples differ in the years 
t, t+1, t+2, t+3 is of particular interest. 
In the following pages, the descriptive statistics of the post-quotation years have been arranged 
into four macro-categories: 
1) General characteristics; 
2) Size & growth; 
3) Efficiency & profitability; 
4) Financial structure & liquidity. 
 
General characteristics 
On average, AIM-listed companies are six years younger than their respective peers. In fact, 
the year of constitution of the former is 1998, while that of the latter is 1992. In this respect, 
Figure 3.7 visually shows the distribution of the year of constitution, for both the listed and 
non-listed subsample. 
 




The 76% of the AIM-listed firms is located in Northern Italy (in absolute terms: 25 out of 33), 
while the remainder is located in Central Italy. 
Figure 3.8 points out the major geographical divergence between the listed and non-listed 
subsample: no AIM-listed firm is located in the South, versus 10% of comparables that is based 
in the South. 
Anyway, the location of the selected peers is quite in line with the geographical distribution of 
the listed subsample, and more than two-thirds of the overall sample is based in the North. 
 
Figure 3.8: Geographical region per subsample 
 
 
On average, the listed firms belong to corporate groups made up of 11 companies. Their non-
listed counterparts, instead, tend to belong to slightly smaller groups, with around 8 companies 
in the corporate group. 
Surprisingly, very few companies operate internationally as exporters (1 listed company and 25 
peers). 
Among the 517 firms of the sample, none is an innovative startup and nearly none (just 10 
peers) is focused on artisan craftsmanship. 
Innovative SMEs represent a minor portion of the sample, but are visibly more numerous 
among the listed firms. Nearly one third (27%) of the AIM-listed firms are innovative SMEs, 







The next part of the exploratory analysis follows a standard scheme. 
I have reported below the economic-financial data, considering median values in order to avoid 
data distortions driven by outliers. Yet, the complete set of statistics – minimum, 1st quartile, 
median, mean, 3rd quartile, maximum – is outlined in Figure 3.9 of the Appendix. 
Also, each quantitative variable has been analysed in the same descriptive way: 
-I have drawn and overlapped the distributions of the quantitative variable in question, for the 
listed and non-listed subsample, in year t, t+1, t+2, t+3. 
-To verify if a significant difference in the quantitative variable exists, between the listed and 
non-listed subsample, I have conducted the t-test65 (in year t, t+1, t+2, t+3). 
In the following pages, only the significantly different distributions are graphically represented; 
while all the other graphs, where statistical differences are not present, are placed in the 
Appendix. 
 
Size & growth 
The variables taken in consideration to analyse size and growth are the following: 
 Revenues & sales growth 
 Assets & assets growth 
 Current assets/Assets & PPE/Assets 
 Intangibles 
 
In the post-listing period, the revenues of listed firms range from €10 million to €15 million. A 
particularly high growth rate characterises the revenues of listed firms in the first two years (6% 
and 9%, respectively). The revenues of the non-listed subsample, instead, stay below €10 
million for the entire analysed time frame, with stable growth rates (of about 4%) in all years. 
Hence, AIM-listed firms tend to have non-significantly higher revenues but significantly higher 
sales growth rates, if compared to their non-listed counterparts. 
 
The listed firms’ assets are above €20 million in the post-listing period, and grow to €30 million. 
Similarly to revenues, the growth rate of assets is highest in the first two years post-quotation 
(6% and 10%, respectively) and decreases in the third year. On the other hand, the assets of 
non-listed companies are stable at €10 million and are characterised by a lower and more stable 
growth rate (less than 4%). 
                                                 
65 The result of the test is detailed beneath the headline of each histogram. A p-value smaller than 0.05 
means that I reject the null hypothesis (H0: no significant difference between the two variables) and, 
therefore, I conclude that a significant difference exists. 
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In general, both assets and assets growth are higher for the listed subsample, but not 
significantly. 
 
Also the structure of total assets is worth of mention. In particular, current assets versus PPE 
are analysed below. 
The share of current assets on total assets is slightly more than 50% for the listed subsample 
and around 70% for the non-listed subsample. Whereas, PPE represent less than 1% and around 
7% of total assets, for listed and non-listed firms, respectively66. 
These shares are constant in the analysed period and signal a significant difference in the 
composition of assets between the two subsamples. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to note that intangibles are significantly higher for the AIM-listed firms. 
More specifically, these are around €2 million for the listed subsample (more than 5 times 
higher than the intangibles of the non-listed subsample). Such high difference in intangibles 
cannot be attributed to the absolute value of assets, because it persists even if intangibles are 
compared to total assets. 
 









                                                 
66 These very low values are probably due to the dominance, in the sample, of tertiary sector activities. 
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Figure 3.11b: Distribution of sales growth 
 
Figure 3.14a: Distribution of Current assets/Assets 
 
 




Figure 3.15a: Distribution of PPE/Assets 
 
Figure 3.15b: Distribution of PPE/Assets 
 




Figure 3.16b: Distribution of intangibles 
 
 
Efficiency & Profitability 
The variables taken in consideration to analyse efficiency and profitability are the following: 
 Operating expenses 
 Capital intensity & asset turnover 






Operating expenses, the ongoing costs incurred by firms for running normal business 
operations, can provide a clue on efficiency. The listed firms’ operating expenses, in line with 
the behaviour of revenues, increase from €10 million to €15 million in the post-quotation years. 
On the other hand, the operating expenses of non-listed firms are constant and below €10 
million. 
Despite being higher in absolute terms for the listed subsample, operating expenses are not 
higher in relative terms if compared to revenues. According to the t-test, a non-significant 
difference in operating expenses exists between the listed and non-listed subsample. 
 
Capital intensity and asset turnover are reciprocal ratios. The former tells the amount of assets 




The capital intensity ratio is around 2 for AIM-listed companies and around 1 for their non-
listed peers. Consistently, the asset turnover ratio is equal to 0.50 and to 0.95, for the listed and 
non-listed subsample, respectively. 
This means that the non-listed firms need to invest less capital to run their business and that the 
listed firms are less efficient in using assets to produce revenues. Both results are statistically 
significant, with a p-value equal to 0.001. 
 
If the attention is turned to the pure profit/loss measure, the listed subsample is characterised 
by a decreasing trend of profits that leads to losses towards the end of the analysed period. In 
fact, profits are slightly above €150 thousands in year t and fall to –€60 thousands in year t+3. 
The non-listed firms, instead, do not exhibit a decreasing trend of profits: profits of peers are 
stable and constant, ranging from €110 thousands to €150 thousands. 
Yet, the p-value does not imply a statistically significant difference in profits between the two 
subsamples. In this respect, the pure profit/loss measure represents an exception because it is 
the only profitability measure for which a non-significant result of the t-test is obtained; all the 
profitability indexes mentioned below are significantly different between the AIM-listed and 
non-listed firms. 
 
The ebitda margin measures a firm’s operating profit as a percentage of its revenues. For the 
listed subsample, the ebitda margin is nearly 10% only in year t and decreases in the susequent 
years (falling to 6%). By contrast, the ebitda margin of the non-listed subsample is stable in 
time at about 8%. 
Hence, the ebitda margin generally tends to be lower in the AIM-listed companies. 
 
Similar results are confirmed by looking at the classic profitability ratios: ROA, ROE and ROI. 
ROA indicates the amount of earnings that derive from €1 of assets, thus suggesting how 
profitable a company is relative to its total assets; ROE is known as the return on net assets and 
measures the financial performance by dividing net income by shareholders' equity; ROI 
estimates the efficiency of investments by comparing the amount of return to investment costs. 
In general, these ratios are lower for the listed subsample. In fact, in year t, the listed firms show 
ratios that are just slightly lower than those of their non-listed counterparts, but that, in the 
following years, decrease. On the other hand, non-listed firms’ ROA, ROE and ROI are constant 
during the whole analysed time frame and equal to 4%, 8% and 7%, respectively. 
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Consequently, a better profitability condition of the non-listed companies is present; while 
listed firms are characterised by lower profitability ratios, which decrease in time and turn into 
negative in the last years of analysis. 
 

















Figure 3.20a: Distribution of Ebitda/Sales 
 
Figure 3.20b: Distribution of Ebitda/Sales 
 




Figure 3.21b: Distribution of ROA 
 
Figure 3.22a: Distribution of ROE 
 
Figure 3.22b: Distribution of ROE 
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Figure 3.23a: Distribution of ROI 
 




Financial structure & liquidity 
The variables taken in consideration to analyse the financial structure and liquidity are the 
following: 
 Equity & NFP 
 D/E 
 Debt/Ebitda & NFP/Ebitda 
 Interest coverage ratio 
 Short-term liabilities/Liabilities 




On average, the listed subsample has more than €10 million of equity. The same figure varies 
between €2 million and €3 million for the non-listed subsample. Not surprisingly, there is a 
higher shareholders’ stake in public companies: equity is significantly higher for the AIM-listed 
firms. 
To evaluate the financial health of companies, the NFP plays a key role. The NFP is an indicator 
of both liquidity and solvency, which is used to determine the overall level of debt of companies 
and, consequently, their ability to meet debt obligations. In fact, by comparing debt to liquid 
assets, the NFP suggests whether a company is overleveraged. 
The listed subsample is characterised by a highly variable positive NFP, of around €1 million 
in year t and of nearly twice as much in year t+3 (about €2 million). Instead, the non-listed 
subsample exhibits a positive and stable NFP of slightly less than €500 thousands. For both 
subsamples, the positive sign of the NFP indicates the firms’ net exposure to lenders; in other 
words, since both listed and non-listed firms have more debt than liquid assets on their balance 
sheet, this means that they hold insufficient liquid and financial resources to pay off debt. 
According to the t-test, no significant difference in the NFP exists between the AIM-listed firms 
and their peers. Actually, even if the NFP of listed companies is higher, the share of NFP on 
total assets is similar between the two groups. 
 
The D/E ratio is a metric used in corporate finance to evaluate financial leverage. It measures 
the extent to which a firm finances its business through debt, compared to wholly-owned funds. 
The leverage of the listed subsample is stable in time at about 0.4, while that of the non-listed 
subsample is stable and slightly higher (at about 0.5). The leverage measure is not significantly 
different between the AIM-listed and non-listed firms: no more than half of the firms’ assets 
are financed by debt. 
 
The debt-on-ebitda ratio measures the amount of earnings generated and available to cover debt 
before paying interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization expenses. 
The listed firms’ debt-on-ebitda ratio is generally a bit lower than that of non-listed firms. More 
specifically, the debt-on-ebitda ratio of AIM-listed companies is always below 1.5, while the 
debt-on-ebitda ratio of non-listed companies stays stable at 1.5 during the whole post-listing 
period. Thus, both subsamples manifest good conditions as for debt load. 
Yet, it is worth to note that listed companies exhibit a particularly promising debt-on-ebitda 
ratio (equal to 0.5) in year t. In this respect, the listing year is the only year with a statistically 
significant difference in the debt-on-ebitda ratio between the two subsamples. 
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Similarly, also NFP-on-ebitda gives an indication of a firm’s ability to pay off its incurred debt: 
this measure gives a clue about how many years are needed for a company to repay its debts 
using ebitda. 
The listed subsample is characterised by a highly variable NFP-on-ebitda, with a peak at about 
0.9 in year t+1. A lack of stability in the NFP-on-ebitda is also present for the non-listed 
subsample: the NFP-on-ebitda varies from 0.5 in year t to a maximum of 0.9 in the two 
subsequent years, and then falls back to 0.6 in year t+3. 
All in all, non-significant differences are present between the two groups, signaling that the 
whole sample has similar ability to repay the debt owed. Actually, the sample is able to repay 
debt using ebitda within less than one year. 
 
The interest coverage ratio is calculated by dividing earnings before interest and taxes by the 
interest payments which are due for the same period. The higher the ratio, the easier it is for a 
company to make interest payments on its debt. 
The listed subample is characterised by an interest coverage ratio equal to 5, while that of the 
non-listed subsample is about twice as much. In other words, companies earn five to ten times 
more than they have to pay out in interest. This means that the sample generates enough 
earnings to cover its minimum debt expenses, hence providing an indication on the sample’s 
financial stability. 
 
The share of short-term liabilities on total liabilities indicate the reliance of firms on short-term 
funding. In this respect, it is important to recall that reliance on short-term funding makes firms 
more vulnerable to liquidity shocks, since debt facilities can be withdrawn immediately, and to 
rising interest rates. 
The listed subsample is characterised by a decreasing trend of the share of short-term liabilities: 
during the analysed period, the share drops from around 0.9 to 0.75. On the other hand, the 
share is constant at 0.9 for the non-listed subsample. Thus, short-term funding is similar in the 
first two years under analysis, but becomes significantly different in the last two years. 
 
The NWC, the difference between current assets and current liabilities, helps to evaluate the 
liquidity and short-term financial health of companies. It provides a cash cushion against 
unexpected expenses and can be reinvested in the firm’s growth.  
The NWC of listed firms is in the range of €2 million to €3 million, while that of non-listed 
firms is slightly above €1 million. Having a positive NWC corresponds to having the possibility 
to invest in future activities and growth, on top of funding current operations. The t-test reports 
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that a statistically significant difference in NWC exists between AIM-listed and non-listed 
firms. 
In the same way, the current ratio – also known as working capital ratio – is a liquidity ratio 
that measures the ability of companies to cover short-term debt obligations by using current 
assets. 
During the analysed period, the current ratio of the listed firms ranges between 1.4 and 1.7; the 
current ratio of the non-listed firms is slightly lower, ranging between 1 and 1.4. In addition, 
for both subsamples, the current ratio is highest in the first two years. 
Overall, although the current ratio is higher for the listed companies, such measure is not 
significantly different between the two subsamples. Hence, the whole sample seems to be 
encountering no difficulty in covering near-term obligations. 
 








Figure 3.27: Distribution of Debt/Ebitda 
 
 
Figure 3.30: Distribution of Short-term liabilities/Liabilities 
 
 




Figure 3.31b: Distribution of NWC 
 
 
3.4 Statistical analysis67 
 
The previous paragraph has dealt with the sample’s descriptive statistics. The distribution of 
each quantitative variable has been drawn for listed and non-listed firms, by using histograms 
and box plots, and the t-test has been conducted. The graphical representation has been provided 
as a means to visually perceive the differences existing between the two subsamples. 
However, running only the t-test does not give a complete view. For this reason, I have recurred 
to a second and more sophisticated statistical tool to gain further insight into the effects of 
listing on AIM Italia: the multiple linear regression. In particular, the aim is to construct a model 
where the IPO decision is the independent variable X and profitability is the response variable 
Y. 
 
The three main details about the multiple linear regression are listed below. 
-Two linear models have been created, where the dependent variable Y is a profitability 
measure: ROA and ROI. 
-The predictor variable of interest is IPO, a dichotomous variable which takes values ‘yes’ or 
‘no’. 
-A series of other independent/control variables, which could potentially impact on 
profitability, have been included in the model. These variables are needed to improve the 
accuracy of the estimates and have been selected so that they belong to the main macro-
categories examined (general characteristics, size and growth, efficiency, financial structure 
and liquidity). Of course, the control variables are the same for the two linear models: 
                                                 
67 All the figures of paragraph 3.4 are Personal elaborations. 
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Ateco + Innovative SME + International + Assets growth + log(Revenues) + Sales growth + 
PPE/Assets + Asset turnover + NFP/Assets + Equity/Assets + Debt/Ebitda + 
Short-term liabilities/Liabilities + NWC 
 
In total, the independent/control variables are 13 (3 categorical and 10 quantitative). In addition, 
as mentioned in the descriptive analysis, let’s keep in mind that some of these control variables 
– the ones underlined – are significantly different between listed and non-listed firms. 
 
By computing the correlation matrix, it is possible to check that highly correlated independent 
variables are not included within the same model. In fact, absence of correlation between the 
quantitative covariates selected for the model means avoiding the collinearity problem. In this 
respect, I have decided to exclude operating expenses from the model because of its high 
correlation with revenues (97%) and assets (87%), which could have negatively affected the 
model. 
Actually, the matrix of correlations among predictors (Table 3.6) shows that the variables that 
I have included in the model are not correlated among each other. In addition, the scatterplot of 
the predictors (Figure 3.33) provides the graphical representation of the just-mentioned 
outcome. 
 
Table 3.6: Correlation matrix of predictors 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1lrevenues_avg 
 
1.0000 -0.2387 0.1420 -0.0794 -0.1256 0.1749 0.4627 -0.0828 0.1271 0.3189 
2salesg_avg 
 
-0.2387 1.0000 0.2024 -0.0211 -0.0615 -0.0892 -0.0418 -0.1199 -0.0699 -0.1144 
3assetg_avg 
 
0.1420 0.2024 1.0000 -0.0607 -0.2529 0.0361 -0.0067 -0.0769 0.0175 0.0948 
4debtebitda_avg 
 
-0.0794 -0.0211 -0.0607 1.0000 0.1900 -0.2548 -0.0511 -0.0780 0.2429 -0.0739 
5ppeass_avg 
 
-0.1256 -0.0615 -0.2529 0.1900 1.0000 -0.4132 -0.1165 0.1302 0.2642 -0.1556 
6stltl_avg 
 
0.1749 -0.0892 0.0361 -0.2548 -0.4132 1.0000 0.0626 0.0685 -0.4222 0.3320 
7nwc_avg 
 
0.4627 -0.0418 -0.0067 -0.0511 -0.1165 0.0626 1.0000 0.3071 -0.2456 -0.1173 
8equityonassets_avg 
 
-0.0828 -0.1199 -0.0769 -0.0780 0.1302 0.0685 0.3071 1.0000 -0.3914 -0.1920 
9nfponassets_avg 
 
0.1271 -0.0699 0.0175 0.2429 0.2642 -0.4222 -0.2456 -0.3914 1.0000 -0.0004 












Figure 3.33: Scatterplot of predictors 
 
 
The multiple regression models are presented in Table 3.7. 
 
ROA ~ β0 + β1 IPO + β2 Ateco + β3 Innovative SME + β4 International + β5 Assets growth + 
β6 log(Revenues) + β7 Sales growth + β8 PPE/Assets + β9 NFP/Assets + β10 Equity/Assets + 
β11 Debt/Ebitda + β12 Short-term liabilities/Liabilities + β13 NWC + β14 Asset turnover 
 
Having a look at the model’s estimated betas and at their significance levels, the main results 
are: 
 The independent variables of the linear model that, to a different degree, have a 
statistically significant impact on ROA, are: IPO, some specific sectorial activities, 
innovative SME, international, assets growth, the logarithmic transformation of 
revenues, NFP/assets, equity/assets, NWC and asset turnover. 
 A significant positive impact on ROA is determined by the variables assets growth, the 
logarithmic transformation of revenues, equity/assets, NWC and asset turnover. 
 A significant negative impact on ROA is determined by the variables IPO, innovative 
SME, international, NFP/assets. 
 
ROI ~ β0 + β1 IPO + β2 Ateco + β3 Innovative SME + β4 International + β5 Assets growth + 
β6 log(Revenues) + β7 Sales growth + β8 PPE/Assets + β9 NFP/Assets + β10 Equity/Assets + 
β11 Debt/Ebitda + β12 Short-term liabilities/Liabilities + β13 NWC + β14 Asset turnover 
 




 The covariates of the linear model that have a statistically significant impact on ROI 
are: IPO, some specific sectorial activities, international, assets growth, NWC and asset 
turnover. 
 A significant positive impact on ROI is determined by assets growth, NWC and asset 
turnover. 
 A significant negative impact on ROI is determined by IPO, international. 
 
Table 3.7: Model summary 
 ROA ROI 











































































R^2 adjusted 0.3551 0.3058 
 ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, °p < 0.1 
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Moreover, by performing the analysis of residuals, I have tested the validity of the results and 
I have discovered that the linear models satisfy the assumptions quite well. In fact, looking at 
the residuals gives a clue on whether the assumed model is adequate. 
Conscious of the fact that, if the assumptions are incorrect, inferences made with the model can 
be misleading, the assumptions are verified below and refer to Figure 3.34b68. 
 Upper left plot (linearity): in a good model, the points should not follow an evident 
pattern and should be randomly distributed around zero, while the red line should be 
quite flat and lying close to the grey dashed one. Here the distribution looks quite 
random and around zero, but some outliers are present. 
 Upper right plot (normality): errors are normally distributed if the points lie on the grey 
dashed line, with some deviation expected near the ends. The assumption is supported, 
except for the presence of some outliers. 
 Lower left plot (heteroscedasticity): the assumption is that the variance in the residuals 
does not change and if the assumption is correct the red line should be flat. The plot 
suggests that a little degree of heteroscedasticity is present. 
 Lower right plot (influential outliers): the leverage value measures the effect of the 
observations on the regression model and, in this plot, it is possible to see if there are 
any influential outliers. Some observations with large Cook’s distance (>0.5) are 
present, indicating that there are some outliers in the sample. 
 
Figure 3.34b: Model plot – ROI 
 
 
Overall, the linear models seem to be satisfying.  
                                                 
68 In the same way, the verified assumptions also refer to Figure 3.34a, Appendix. 
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As for accuracy, the model explains around one third of the variability of profitability. More 
specifically, the adjusted R-squared is equal to 36% and 30%, in the first (ROA) and second 
(ROI) model, respectively. 
 
In conclusion, to answer the research question on whether listing on AIM offers benefits to 
firms, the relation between the decision of going public and profitability must be considered. In 
both models a significant reduction in profitability occurs as a result of the listing choice: the 
IPO variable determines a reduction of both ROA and ROI. This result confirms the results of 





RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Main findings and key considerations 
 
Chapter 3 has illustrated the descriptive and statistical analysis conducted to assess the post-
listing performance of companies newly listed on AIM Italia. The analysis has adopted a 
comparative perspective, always studying the performance of AIM-listed firms with respect to 
their non-listed peers. The aim is now to provide a brief summary of the most relevant results, 
together with the answer to my research question. Thus, Chapter 4 intends to understand 
whether listing on AIM offers benefits to companies. 
 
First of all, it is important to recall that, during the pre-listing years, the AIM-listed companies 
and their peers were statistically comparable. But, in the post-quotation period, what is the 
effect of the listing decision? 
To answer this question, I have performed the analysis by considering four macro-categories 
(general characteristics, size and growth, efficiency and profitability, financial structure and 
liquidity) and by constructing a multiple linear regression. The main and most important 
outcome is that the decision of listing actually affects the profitability of companies in the post-
listing years; yet, before focusing the attention on this result, let’s recap the major findings of 
the descriptive investigation. 
1. AIM-listed companies are mainly engaged in communication, manufacturing activities and 
professional/scientific/technical services. They are mostly located in the North and are, on 
average, six years younger than their respective peers. Also, it is interesting to note that 
Innovative SMEs are visibly more numerous among the listed firms: one third of the AIM-listed 
firms are innovative SMEs, compared to just the 2% of the non-listed subsample. 
2. In the post-listing period, AIM-listed firms tend to have non-significantly higher revenues 
but significantly higher sales growth rates, if compared to their non-listed counterparts; and 
both assets and assets growth are higher for the listed subsample, even if not significantly. In 
addition, it is worth to note that the composition of assets is significantly different between the 
two subsamples: a case in point, intangibles of AIM-listed firms are more than 5 times higher 
than the intangibles of the non-listed subsample. 
Hence, AIM-listed companies tend to be more dynamic and increasing in size, especially in the 
first two years post-quotation. Non-listed firms, instead, are characterised by a greater stability 
in trends for the whole analysed period. 
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3. While a non-significant difference in operating expenses exists post-listing, both capital 
intensity and asset turnover are significantly different between the listed and non-listed 
subsample, thus suggesting that the listed firms are less efficient in using assets to produce 
revenues. These ratios could signal a lower efficiency of the AIM-listed firms, which is not 
testified by operating expenses. 
Moreover, the listed subsample is characterised by a decreasing trend of profits that leads to 
losses towards the end of the analysed period. In fact, all the examined profitability indexes (i.e. 
EBITDA/Sales, ROA, ROE, ROI) are significantly different between the AIM-listed and non-
listed firms and all go in the same direction: the profitability ratios in the post-listing period are 
lower and declining for the listed subsample. 
In contrast, the non-listed firms exhibit better profitability results characterised by stability in 
time. Consequently, a worse profitability condition of the listed companies is present. 
4. Not surprisingly, there is a significantly higher shareholders’ stake in public companies. 
NWC is positive, and significantly higher for listed firms, denoting the possibility to invest in 
future activities and growth. Also, while short-term funding is similar in the first two years 
under analysis, it becomes significantly lower for listed firms in the last two years. 
Yet, in general, a part from these exceptions, results for financial structure and liquidity are 
similar between the two subsamples. In fact, according to the t-test, in the majority of cases no 
significant differences in financial health exist between the AIM-listed firms and their peers. 
For instance, the companies in the sample have not been aggressive in financing their growth 
with debt: no more than half of the firms’ assets are financed by debt. Thus, both subsamples 
manifest good conditions as for debt load and are not overleveraged. 
In addition, the sample has similar ability in meeting debt obligations; actually, it is able to 
repay debt using ebitda within less than one year. This suggests that firms do not seem to be 
struggling to pay off their creditors and to cover near-term obligations. 
Overall, these results provide a positive indication of adequate liquidity and good overall 
financial health for the AIM-listed companies and their peers. 
 
The most striking outcome of the descriptive analysis regards the link between listing and 
decline of profits in the post-listing years. AIM-listed companies’ profit measures are not only 
significantly lower with respect to those of their non-listed counterparts, but also declining in 
time. 
Such finding is also confirmed by the two multiple linear regressions presented in paragraph 
3.4. Given the same set of control variables, the IPO decision determines a reduction of both 
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ROA and ROI69. In other words, both models testify that a significant decrease in profitability 
occurs as a result of the listing choice. In this respect, Figure 4.1 graphically depicts below the 
just-mentioned outcome: it is possible to note that the distributions of ROA and ROI for the 
AIM-listed firms (IPO=yes) take lower values if compared to firms that stay private. 
 
Figure 4.1: Distributions of ROA & ROI (listed versus non-listed) 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Then, it just comes natural to ask ourselves: why does this happen? What drives down the profit 
measures of AIM-listed companies? Providing an absolute answer to this question is difficult, 
but hypotheses can be formulated. 
To formulate my hypotheses, the starting point of my line of reasoning is represented by the 
control variables of the linear model. It is worth to recall that, according to the t-test, some of 
the control variables are statistically different between listed and non-listed firms. 
Consequently, if I want to look for the driver of post-listing differential performance, I must 
start by examining the variables that affect profitability and that are statistically different in the 
two subsamples70.  
Firstly, from the descriptive analysis, it is clear that AIM-listed companies are characterised by 
overall good financial health. Hence, the positive financial structure and the liquidity position 
do not explain why listed companies are subject to lower profits. This intuition is confirmed by 
looking at the estimates of the model: the control variables, which refer to this macro-category 
and are statistically different between the two subsamples, exhibit signs that go in favour of the 
                                                 
69 In the models, the beta coefficients for IPO are around -5 and -4, respectively. 
70 As a matter of facts, to find an explanation, considering the variables that are similar between listed 
and non-listed firms has no sense; conversely, it may be possible to find out why the profitability of 
AIM-listed firms worsens post-quotation by examining the control variables that are statistically 
different between the two subsamples. 
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profitability of listed firms. Thus, I can conclude that the motive must be searched for 
elsewhere. 
Size and growth is the second macro-category of analysis that could potentially explain the 
lower profitability linked to the listing choice. In this respect, the linear regression contains, 
among others, the control variable sales growth. Sales growth is significantly higher for listed 
firms and, in the model, is characterised by a negative coefficient, confirming that the higher 
sales growth of AIM-listed companies has a negative effect on profitability. However, such 
effect appears to be negligible because sales growth is not a significant variable inside the 
model. 
If attention is shifted to the efficiency dimension, asset turnover could provide us with a clue. 
In fact, the asset turnover ratio is significantly lower for the AIM-listed subsample, suggesting 
that the latter is less efficient in using assets to produce revenues. Also, this variable is 
significant in the multiple linear regression and is associated to a positive coefficient, meaning 
that the potentially lower efficiency of listed firms directly reflects into a lower level of 
profitability. However, such apparently reasonable conclusion is questionable because just a 
moderate71 correlation seems to be present between asset turnover and profitability.  
Last but not least, the general characteristics of the two subsamples must be considered; in 
particular, the qualitative variable Innovative SME is worth of mention. SMEs characterised by 
a strong innovation component are more numerous among the AIM-listed firms. In addition, in 
the linear models this categorical variable takes negative coefficients72, signalling that being 
innovative seems to be associated to lower profitability – this intuition is illustrated in Figure 
4.2. 
Figure 4.2: Innovation versus profitability 
 
Source: Personal elaboration 
                                                 
71 The correlation between asset turnover and profitability is positive but not strong (0.3<ρ<0.4). 
72 The models’ beta coefficients for Innovative SMEs are around -3 (significant) and -2, respectively. 
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This very last result could turn to be relevant to formulate a conclusion. In fact, if compared to 
the non-listed subsample, AIM-listed companies possess a significantly higher amount of 
intangibles (e.g. R&D) and are more focused on innovation. Consequently, the AIM-listed 
firms’ greater propensity towards innovation, as part of a long-term looking growth-enhancing 
strategy, could explain why profitability declines in the short-run (t, t+1, t+2, t+3). 
By relying on the previous statement, I can assume that the AIM-listed firms of my sample are 
not interested in rebalancing their financial structure: their decision to list could be rather linked 
to the aim of financing innovation and future growth. However, the implementation of growth 
strategies is likely to compromise profitability, especially in the short term; it is common 
knowledge that, to achieve an expansion goal in the medium-long term, management has to 
give up competitive advantage in the short term. 
 
All the above reasoning is an attempt to explain the main and most important finding of my 
dissertation: listing affects the profitability of companies in the post-quotation years. 
The considerations made in the previous pages are not to be intended as absolute truths, but 
seek to provide food for thought. My suggestions are constructed by relying on the variables 
collected for the analysis, yet I am aware of the fact that many other non-verifiable factors could 
contribute to explaining the listed subsample’s worse performance. 
For sure, the outcome is puzzling and, after reading the results of my research, the reader might 
be asking himself/herself questions73. However, something is absolutely clear: it is very 
challenging to identify the exact motive for a decline in post-IPO operating performance. In 
literature, this trend of underperformance is one of the least explained regularities. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, to justify this anomaly, academics provide some theoretical – difficult 
to verify – explanations like the ability to choose the right timing for the quotation, window 




                                                 
73 What if the companies, which decide to go public, are worse ex ante? In this respect, Piotroski (2013) 
claims that the AIM seems to be a ‘landing pad for struggling firms’ rather than a ‘launching pad for 
highfliers’. Nonetheless, the AIM-listed firms in my sample are comparable pre-quotation to their 
respective peers, so it is difficult to believe that the listed subsample is worse than the non-listed one ex-
ante. 
What if the costs of listing impact on short-run profitability? I would exclude this possibility because I 
believe that, if this were the case, a negative peak in profitability would occur in the quotation year t. 
Instead, results show that profitability keeps decreasing during all the analysed period. 
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4.2 Theoretical confirmation and practical implication 
 
The findings of my dissertation thesis are in line with previous literature. The common ground 
behind the empirical contributions presented in Chapter 2 is the tendency towards a significant 
worsening of the operating performance of newly listed firms; by analysing the main financial 
indexes and ratios of my AIM-listed subsample, I have reached similar outcomes. 
In this respect, Table 4.1 briefly summarises some of the theories that are consistent with the 
results of my empirical analysis. 
 
Table 4.1: Summary of the results 
Authors Results 
Alexander and Mayer (1991) 
As for the financial structure, listed firms finance 
themselves by raising more equity capital or through 
medium- and long-term loans; instead, unlisted firms tend 
to raise short-term loans. 
Jain and Kini (1994) 
The median operating return on assets decreases in the 
quotation year and keeps on worsening for a few more 
years, while the corresponding industry-peers either exhibit 
stable patterns or decrease to a smaller extent. 
Simultaneously, the newly-listed firms experience high 
revenue growth. 
Cowling et al. (2002) 
The growth patterns of net sales and profits are sharply 
reduced after the offering. 
Khurshed et al. (2003)  
Companies going public on the English Official List 
experience a significant decline, in terms of ROA, ROE 
and asset turnover, after the IPO. 
Carpenter and Rondi (2006) 
The post-IPO growth rates of total assets and sales of 
Italian companies are positive. 
Paleari et al. (2008) 
Post-listing operating underperformance is testified by a 
permanent and significant drop in profitability, measured 
in terms of return on assets and return on equity.  
Revest and Sapio (2014) 
While, on the one hand, an overall positive influence of the 
AIM on company size is reported, on the other hand, the 
productivity growth (e.g. value added per employee) of 
AIM-listed companies is slower (-20.7%) than that of 
private companies. 
Doukas and Hoque (2016) 
A poor post-listing operating performance of AIM firms is 
reported: AIM UK firms are loss-making. 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Yet, recall that the majority of Chapter 2 has been dedicated to the analyses of post-listing 
effects on main markets, because relatively little attention from the empirical literature has been 
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given to companies that go public on the AIM. Thus, it is interesting to note that matching 
findings do exist anyway: even if theory focuses on main markets while my empirical research 
is based on a secondary market, post-listing effects seem to be the same. I could then infer that 
the effect of listing does not vary depending on the type of market under consideration. Also, 
by relying on studies made on main markets, constructing expectations about the effectiveness 
of listing on AIM Italia seems to be reliable. 
 
In conclusion, studying the post-listing effects can provide useful information about changes in 
the economic-financial performance experienced by newly-listed firms. Actually, from a 
practical point of view, conducting this type of analysis is useful for business consultancies. 
For instance, by relying on the findings of my empirical research, it is possible to give some 
advice to all those SMEs that are considering listing on AIM Italia – and to those that will 
consider doing so in the future. 
According to Chapter 3, the listing decision seems to negatively affect profitability: the effect 
of the IPO on ROA and ROI is negative and significant. In other words, listed SMEs appear to 
be characterised post-quotation by worse performance indicators with respect to non-listed 
companies. Thus, the main outcome of my dissertation questions the existence of a beneficial 
impact of listing on AIM Italia – as regards operating performance. In fact, since the AIM-listed 
firms’ profits are lower and declining in the short-run, listing appears to be risky74 for SMEs. 
Therefore, based on the just-mentioned evidence, my prudent recommendation to Italian SMEs 
is to avoid listing – if distressed or if their objective is that of increasing short-term profit 
measures. 
However, a further consideration must be made: my empirical research has a limitation because 
it focuses just on the quotation year and on the three post-listing years. Given that the complete 
post-listing effects are detectable only after a rather long period of time, the longer term should 
also be examined to provide a surely reliable practical advice. By shifting the focus away from 
short-term results, what could emerge is that the short-run underperformance is the cost to be 
borne in order to achieve an expansion goal in the medium-long term. If this were the case, 
listing would represent the correct choice. For this reason, I believe that further research on this 
topic is important. 
My suggestions for future research regard studying the causes of post-listing underperformance 
and the long-term effects of listing on AIM Italia. Understanding the specific driver behind the 
                                                 
74 Of course, any company considering the possibility of going public makes a cost-benefit analysis and 
the final listing choice could be driven by non-financial reasons too. 
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post-listing underperformance phenomenon together with adopting a long-run perspective is, 







The empirical analysis on the effectiveness of listing on the AIM Italia has been performed with 
the aim of assessing whether going public offers benefits to the Italian small-sized companies.  
To address this research question I have examined the post-listing performance of companies 
newly listed on the AIM Italia by adopting a comparative approach. In other words, I have 
selected a sample of AIM-listed companies and I have identified a number of non-listed firms 
that were comparable (on the base of industry, size, profitability and governance structure) 
during the pre-listing years; in this way, I have created a final sample consisting of 33 listed 
companies and 484 comparable firms. Subsequently, by studying the performance of AIM-
listed firms with respect to that of their respective peers, I have detected if significant 
differences in corporate performance exist in the post-listing period. 
 
To gain some insights into the effects of the listing decision, four macro-categories – general 
characteristics, size and growth, efficiency and profitability, financial structure and liquidity – 
have been analysed and a multiple linear regression has been constructed. 
The most striking outcome of my analysis regards the link between listing and decline of profits 
in the post-listing years. The IPO decision seems to determine a reduction of both ROA and 
ROI, testifying that a significant decrease in profitability occurs as a result of the listing choice. 
Thus, listed SMEs appear to be characterised post-quotation by worse performance indicators 
with respect to non-listed companies. In addition, AIM-listed companies’ profit measures are 
not only significantly lower with respect to those of their non-listed counterparts, but are also 
declining in time. Consequently, since the AIM-listed firms’ profits are lower and declining in 
the short-run, going public on the AIM Italia could be risky. These are the main insights into 
the effects of listing on the AIM Italia gained from my dissertation. 
Furthermore, it is worth to recall that my finding is in line with previous literature. By analysing 
the main financial indexes and ratios, a majority of authors seem to witness, after the IPO, 
poorly performing firms. Several studies document that the accounting performance of IPOs 
undergoes a significant deterioration and that companies experience a drop in profitability in 
the post-quotation period. Hence, the outcomes that I have reached for the AIM Italia are similar 
to those achieved by scholars for main markets. 
 
In conclusion, the results of my dissertation thesis question the existence of a beneficial impact 
of listing on the AIM Italia – as regards operating performance. In fact, if I consider the short-
term results of my empirical analysis, the benefits of IPO firms in terms of profitability are 
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dubious. However, my research has a limitation because it focuses just on the quotation year 
and on the three post-listing years. Given that the complete post-listing effects are detectable 
only after a rather long period of time, the longer-term should also be examined by future 






Table 3.3: Final sample 
AIM company Peer company 
AMBROMOBILIARE S.P.A. 
RECONSULT S.R.L. 
CAVRENGHI PROFESSIONALS S.R.L. 
J&P ITALIA S.R.L. 
GFC ASSOCIATI S.R.L. 
STUDIO GLORIOSO S.R.L. 
SECURITAS S.R.L. 
BW CONSULTING S.R.L. 
ATHOS CONSULTING S.R.L. 
SINTESIS - SERVIZI INTEGRATI PER LE IMPRESE S.R.L. 
GEA AMBIENTE S.R.L. 
EPI.FIN. S.R.L. 
RIVALS - SOCIETA' A RESPONSABILITA' LIMITATA 
SYNERGIA S.R.L. 
MC52 S.R.L. 
STUDIO GRAVA S.R.L. 
AREA CONSULTING S.R.L. 
AZIENDA E LAVORO S.R.L. 
MARSIAJ S.R.L. 
COMI & P. S.R.L. 
ADVISA CONSULTING SRL 
ASSITECA S.P.A. 
AGENZIA GENERALE INA - ASSITALIA MONZA B.B.R. ASSICURAZIONI S.R.L. 
CAMBIASO RISSO MARINE SOCIETA' PER AZIONI 





GIVE EMOTIONS SRL 
PENTA GROUP S.R.L. 
PUBLICOMM SRL 
TUTTOPRESS EDITRICE S.R.L. 
GIVI S.R.L. 
1MEDIA S.R.L. 
EDIZIONI TURBO S.R.L. 
PG SERVICE DI MANERA ERICA S.R.L. 
DUESSEGI EDITORE S.R.L. 
DAGOSPIA S.P.A. 
TEKNO SCIENZE S.R.L. 
HEPI PRESS S.R.L. 
SUMO PUBLISHING S.R.L. 
LOZZI PUBLISHING S.R.L. 
EDIZIONI IF S.R.L. 
 
1 All Tables/Figures in the Appendix 
are Personal elaborations 
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CALEIDO GROUP S.P.A. 
GREEN LINE TOUR S.P.A. IN FORMA ABBREVIATA G.L.T. S.P.A. 
TRAVEL GROUP ALBERGHI S.R.L. 
AVION TRAVEL (AGENZIA VIAGGI TURISMO) S.R.L. 
3A TOURS S.R.L. 
GUINESS TRAVEL S.R.L. 
IL SIPARIO MUSICALE ITINERARI DI MUSICA ED ARTE S.R.L. 
C.A.R.S. COOPERATIVA ASSISTENZA RICREAZIONE SOCIALE - SOCIETA' 
COOPERATIVA 
H&A S.R.L. 
BRERA 21 S.R.L. 
IC BELLAGIO SRL 
TARGET MOTIVATION S.R.L. 
CUSTOMIZED S.R.L. 
ABACO VIAGGI SRL 
ALIJET & FARGO INTERNATIONAL S.R.L. 
TUSCANYALL.COM S.R.L. 
POSEIDONE - S.R.L. 
AVVENTURE BELLISSIME S.R.L. 
GDSM GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION SALES & MARKETING S.R.L. 





G.A.L. VALLE D'ITRIA S.C. A R.L. 
QUATTRO C S.R.L. 
FM - SOCIAL INVESTMENT S.R.L. IMPRESA SOCIALE 
NORDOFFICE SRL 
VTL E ASSOCIATI- SOCIETA A RESPONSABILITA' LIMITATA 
CM & PARTNERS S.R.L. 
BRIXIA S.R.L. 
SANTO STEFANO SERVIZI SOCIETA' A RESPONSABILITA' LIMITATA 
ELFREM S.R.L. 
FRA-MAR S.P.A. 






WORKYNG CONSULTING S.R.L. 
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CLABO SOCIETA' PER 
AZIONI 
MALVESTIO SOCIETA' PER AZIONI (ABBREVIATA IN MALVESTIO S.P.A.) 
NOCTIS S.P.A. 




ITALIA LIVING S.R.L. 
GIBAM SHOPS - S.P.A. 
QUADRIFOGLIO SISTEMI D'ARREDO S.P.A. 
RIMADESIO S.P.A. 




BROS MANIFATTURE S.R.L. 
ARPER S.P.A. 
FLEXFORM - S.P.A. 
GEVEN S.P.A. 
COSTAMP GROUP S.P.A. 
DELLAS S.P.A. 
NTS S.P.A. 
GAPE DUE S.P.A. 
MERONI F.LLI S.R.L. 
ELMANN SRL 
BIANCHI CASSEFORME - S.R.L. 
VIRO S.P.A. 
O.F.A.S.-S.P.A. 
TRATTER ENGINEERING S.R.L. 
D'ANDREA SPA 
MISTA - MINUTERIE E STAMPI - SOCIETA' PER AZIONI SIGLABILE MISTA - S.P.A. 
I.T.R. INDUSTRIA TRASFORMAZIONE RESINE S.R.L. 
PINTI-INOX S.P.A. 
EURO STAMPAGGI S.P.A. 
FEBAMETAL S.P.A. 
VETIMEC SOCIETA' COOPERATIVA 
BOART & WIRE S.R.L. 




COVER 50 S.P.A. 
INDUSTRIA CONFEZIONI MONTECATINI IN.CO.M. - S.P.A. 
MALLONI S.P.A. 
RO - DEL S.P.A. 
FACTORY S.R.L. 
CA' DA MOSTO S.P.A. 
IL GUFO S.P.A. 
GI.MEL S.R.L. 
INDUSTRIAL STARTER -S.P.A. 
MANIFATTURA CORONA S.R.L. 
ZAMASPORT SPA 
MANIFATTURA RIESE S.P.A. 
CONFEZIONI E FACON S.R.L. CON SIGLA CIEFFE S.R.L. 




DIGITAL MAGICS S.P.A. 
SO.GE.S. IMM. SRL - REAL ESTATE 
AGROTECNICA S.R.L. 
EUROPA RISORSE S.R.L. 
NOMISMA - SOCIETA' DI STUDI ECONOMICI - S.P.A. 
CONSORZIO NAZIONALE SERVIZI GLOBALI PER LA CIRCOLAZIONE DEI MEZZI DI 
TRASPORTO 
IDROTIRRENA COMMERCIALE - S.R.L. 
DEDALO S.R.L. 
CONSULMAN S.R.L. 
I. E O. - INFORMATICA E ORGANIZZAZIONE S.R.L. 
COEMA S.R.L. 
GIGLIO GTO MANAGEMENT SRL 
I.T.C. - ITALIAN TRADE CONSULTANT - S.R.L. CON SIGLA I.T.C. S.R.L. 
TECNICAM - S.R.L. 




GRUPPO FMA SRL 
TANDEM PUBBLICITA' S.R.L. 
ASPEN MEDIA ITALIA S.R.L. 
SISMA ITALIA S.R.L. 
GRUPPO POZZI S.R.L. 
SALCOM S.R.L. 
ADRIATICA PUBBLICITA' S.R.L. 
D.S. S.R.L. 
V.G. PUBBLICITA' - S.R.L. 
EXOMEDIA S.R.L. 
THE BRAND SHOP - SOCIETA' A RESPONSABILITA' LIMITATA 
MULTIRADIO S.R.L. 




DOVI 4 S.R.L. 
ECOSUNTEK S.P.A. 
ODOARDO ZECCA S.R.L. 
ABENERGIE S.P.A. O A.B. ENERGIE S.P.A. 
VITALE SUD - SOCIETA' PER AZIONI 
ENERLUX S.R.L. 
ALBA POWER SOCIETA' PER AZIONI SIGLABILE ANCHE ALBA POWER S.P.A. 
BENACO ENERGIA SPA 
INTERCONSULT S.P.A. 
MASTROPASQUA INTERNATIONAL - S.P.A. 
ENERGY SYSTEM S.R.L. 
+ ENERGIA S.P.A. 
SOCIETA' ELETTRICA IN MORBEGNO SOCIETA' COOPERATIVA PER AZIONI 
ENOMONDO S.R.L. 
IDROBLINS S.R.L. 
SF ENERGY SRL 
ENERGICA MOTOR 
COMPANY S.P.A. 
SWM MOTORCYCLES S.R.L. 
MOTO MORINI S.R.L. 
FANTIC MOTOR S.P.A. 
F.LLI ZANONI SRL 
NEWFREN S.R.L. 
ESTRIMA S.R.L. 






ICES - EBM S.R.L. 
SEMAR S.R.L. 
ATEX INDUSTRIES S.R.L. 
GEMINI TECHNOLOGIES - S.R.L. 
S.A.P.S. S.R.L. STAMPI ATTREZZATURE PRODOTTI STAMPATI 
PICIESSE ELETTRONICA S.R.L. 
SIRIO ELETTRONICA SRL 
ELECTRONIC SERVICE S.R.L. 
GECA S.R.L. 





E.B. TECHNOLOGY S.R.L. 
LED S.P.A. 
EXPERT SYSTEM S.P.A. 
EPIPOLI SPA 
ADITINET CONSULTING SPA 
AURIGA S.P.A. 
DGS S.P.A. 
PLUSERVICE - S.R.L. 
INTERSISTEMI ITALIA S.P.A. 
TESI SPA 




ESRI ITALIA SPA 
METODA - S.P.A. 
LYNX S.P.A. 
SSE - SOFITER SYSTEM ENGINEERING S.P.A. SIGLABILE SSE S.P.A. 
SEA VISION S.R.L. 
PIC SERVIZI PER L'INFORMATICA S.R.L. 








LEO PIZZO S.P.A. 
VALENTI & CO. S.R.L. 
SAMPA S.P.A. 
LOTO PREZIOSI S.P.A. 
GOLD ART S.R.L. 
LAC S.P.A. 
LI.VI.OR. S.P.A. 
INDUSTRIE TESTI S.P.A. 
CHRYSOS S.P.A. 
NOMINATION S.R.L. 
ARETINA METALLI PREZIOSI S.P.A. (IN SIGLA A.M.P. S.P.A.) 
PICCHIOTTI - S.R.L. 
MATTIOLI S.P.A. 
RASELLI FRANCO S.P.A. 
GIMET BRASS S.R.L. 
GIORGIO FEDON & FIGLI 
SPA 
GRITTI GROUP S.P.A. 
AMEDEO NAPPI INDUSTRIA CERARIA S.P.A. 
SVAD DONDI S.P.A. 
PONZINI -S.P.A. 
BOTTONIFICIO PADANO SOCIETA' PER AZIONI 
RACCAGNI GROUP S.R.L. 
CROCI S.P.A. 
SORINI E MIGLIAVACCA SPA 
CAMP S.P.A. COSTRUZIONE ARTICOLI MONTAGNA - PREMANA 
FERRARI S.P.A. 
BOTTONIFICIO B.A.P. S.P.A. 
GO INTERNET S.P.A 
BT-MONITORING S.R.L. 
MOBILE SOLUTION S.R.L. 
TELEREADING S.R.L. 
SPECIAL SERVICE S.R.L. - IN LIQUIDAZIONE 
R. PIERRE DIGITAL S.P.A. 
EUROTEL S.R.L. 
SINTEL SRL 




MONTE MASSA MARTANO - SOCIETA' A RESPONSABILITA' LIMITATA 
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GRUPPO GREEN POWER 
S.P.A. 
UPSOLAR SYSTEM ITALIA S.R.L. 
VERMEER ITALIA S.R.L. 
COMESTERO SISTEMI S.P.A. 
FORNITURE ARTICOLI ELETTRO TECNICI S.R.L. IN FORMA ABBREVIATA FAET - 
S.R.L. 
DALLA VECCHIA FABRIZIO & C. S.R.L. 
TEST S.R.L. 
I.M.A. - S.R.L. 
SPINA GROUP S.R.L. 
CABLE SERVICE S.R.L. 
C.I.D.A.T. - S.P.A. - CENTRO INTERNAZIONALE DISTRIBUZIONE ARTICOL I TECNICI IN 
BREVE CIDAT S.P.A. 
INTERNATIONAL POWER COMPONENTS S.R.L. 
RISP S.R.L. 
SEIPEE S.P.A. 
RANIERI TONISSI S.P.A. 
ELETTROTEK KABEL S.P.A. 
FERWOOD S.R.L. 
COENERGIA S.R.L. 
NUOVA RICAMBI SRL 
SORMA SPA 
I.R. ITALIANA RIPROGRAFIA S.R.L. 
H-FARM S.P.A. 
TBS IT TELEMATIC & BIOMEDICAL SERVICES S.R.L. 
SEDIIN - S.P.A. 
SSE - SOFITER SYSTEM ENGINEERING S.P.A. SIGLABILE SSE S.P.A. 
NOVANEXT SOCIETA' A RESPONSABILITA' LIMITATA 
INTERSERVICE S.R.L. 
METISOFT S.P.A. 
IFM INFOMASTER S.P.A. 
MARIFIN S.R.L. 
UNITEAM S.R.L. 
CODIN - SOCIETA' PER AZIONI 
ADVANCED GLOBAL SOLUTION A.G.S. S.P.A. 
PRESENT S.P.A. 
SIRFIN SOCIETA' PER L'INFORMATICA SPA. CON SIGLA SIRFIN SPA. 
ESSEMATICA - S.P.A. 




IMMOBILIARE GAMMA S.R.L. 
COMMERCIALE SIRI S.R.L. 
FOSFITALIA IMMOBILIARE S.P.A. 
TURNO S.R.L. 
G.I.PA. - GESTIONI INVESTIMENTI PARTECIPAZIONI - S.P.A. 
ILMA S.R.L. 
IMMOBILIARE COBRA S.R.L. 
DIGIO S.R.L. 
VENINA 90 S.P.A. 
MONTECASTELLO S.P.A. 
IMMOBILIARE RHO MILANO S.R.L. 
IMMOBILIARE ROMA S.R.L. 
BENINVEST S.R.L. 
IMMOBILIARE FRANCI SRL 
TECHNOSPARE IMMOBILIARE S.R.L. 
IMMOBILIARE DIANA SOCIETA' A RESPONSABILITA' LIMITATA 
IMMOBILIARE ARDELIA S.R.L. 
MONTFIN S.R.L. 
IMMOBILIARE GIDUE SRL 
RELBERG S.R.L. 
INIZIATIVE BRESCIANE - 
INBRE - S.P.A. 
ECOFIM - COMPAGNIA FINANZA E MATTONE S.R.L. 
EDIF HOLDING S.P.A. 
CO.STAMP - SRL 
BOFFI S.P.A. 
VICTORIA HD SRL 
SUGARMUSIC S.P.A. 
GHIAL HOLDING S.P.A. 
PALAZZO FERONI FINANZIARIA S.P.A. 
LEONE FILM GROUP S.P.A. 
ARTIS EDIZIONI DIGITALI S.R.L. 
MINERVA PICTURES GROUP S.R.L. 
RED FILM - SOCIETA' A RESPONSABILITA' LIMITATA 
BIBI' FILM TV S.R.L. 
CASANOVA MULTIMEDIA S.P.A. 
MOVIE PLANET S.R.L. 
ARCADIA S.R.L. 
M2 PICTURES S.R.L. 
VIDEA S.P.A. 
FASO FILM - SOCIETA A RESPONSABILITA LIMITATA 
COGES SPA 
TARGET COMMUNICATIONS SRL 
INDIGO FILM SRL 
LEVANTE - S.R.L. 
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MASI AGRICOLA S.P.A. 
SUN LAND S.P.A. 
CANTINE BRUSA - SOCIETA' PER AZIONI 
CANTINE RIUNITE & CIV - SOCIETA' COOPERATIVA AGRICOLA 
FERRARELLE - S.P.A. 
TERRE CEVICO - GRUPPO CENTRO VINICOLO COOPERATIVO ROMAGNOLO SOCIETA' 
COOPERATIVA AGRICOLA 
BIRRA CASTELLO S.P.A. 
CASA VINICOLA ZONIN S.P.A. 
BIRRA FORST S.P.A. 
FRATELLI MARTINI SECONDO LUIGI S.P.A. 
CASA VINICOLA BOTTER CARLO & C. SPA 
ACQUA MINERALE SAN BENEDETTO S.P.A. 
MAILUP S.P.A. 
T COMMUNICATION S.R.L. 
ASCOM SERVIZI MODENA SOCIETA' COOPERATIVA 
DOMINO S.R.L 
TEC S.R.L. 
QUALITA' E ATTESTAZIONI AZIENDALI S.R.L. 
SAFO GROUP S.P.A. 
G.M. SYSTEM 2000 S.R.L. 
SERVIZIO INFORMATICA S.R.L. 
S.C. STUDIO ASSOCIATO S.R.L. 




TDL GLOBAL OUTSOURCING SRL 
TC & C S.R.L. 
MICRODISEGNO S.R.L. 
EDISERVICE S.R.L. 
EDILPORTALE.COM - S.P.A. 
ATHENAEUM S.P.A. 




SOCIETA' PER AZIONI 
EUROPRODUZIONE S.R.L. 
FOTOCINEMA S.R.L. 
LEVANTE - S.R.L. 




NEP BROADCAST SERVICES ITALY S.R.L. 
VIDEO 7 S.R.L. 
RADA FILM - SOCIETA' A RESPONSABILITA' LIMITATA 
CINE VIDEO DOPPIATORI C.V.D. SOCIETA' COOPERATIVA A RESPONSABILITA' 
LIMITATA 
V.S.S.VIDEO SOUND SERVICE SRL 
BIBI' FILM TV S.R.L. 
VIDEO PROGETTI S.R.L. 
MORMORA MUSIC S.R.L. 
I.B.C. MOVIE S.R.L. 
RED FILM - SOCIETA' A RESPONSABILITA' LIMITATA 
PACO CINEMATOGRAFICA - S.R.L. 
ZEROSTUDIO'S SOCIETA' A RESPONSABILITA' LIMITATA 
S.D.L. 2005 S.R.L. 
PRISMI S.P.A. 
UNITEAM S.R.L. 
STUDIO INFORMATICA S.R.L. 
PLANETEK ITALIA S.R.L. 
EPIPOLI SPA 
ATS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS S.P.A. 
METISOFT S.P.A. 
METODA - S.P.A. 
SEDIIN - S.P.A. 
CONSOFT SISTEMI SOCIETA' PER AZIONI IN FORMA ABBREVIATA CONSOFT SISTEMI 
S.P.A. 
SIRFIN SOCIETA' PER L'INFORMATICA SPA. CON SIGLA SIRFIN SPA. 
SSE - SOFITER SYSTEM ENGINEERING S.P.A. SIGLABILE SSE S.P.A. 
PIC SERVIZI PER L'INFORMATICA S.R.L. 
READYTEC SOCIETA' PER AZIONI IN BREVE READYTEC S.P.A. 
LINKS - MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY - S.P.A. IN SIGLA LINKS S.P. A. 
C.R.M. S.R.L. 
ROSETTI MARINO S.P.A. 
MANITALIDEA SPA 





SITI - B&T GROUP S.P.A. 
JOBS AUTOMAZIONE S.P.A. IN VIA ABBREVIATA ANCHE DENOMINATA JOBS S.P.A. 
CASAGRANDE S.P.A. 
COMERIO ERCOLE S.P.A. 
SAMPIERANA S.P.A. 
ELETTRIC 80 S.P.A. 
VERTIV S.R.L. 
DELLA TOFFOLA S.P.A. 
B.M.B. S.P.A. 






GRUPPO CIMBALI S.P.A. 
SPEA S.P.A. 
SOFTEC S.P.A. 
TEST POINT S.R.L. 
AVANGARDE CONSULTING S.R.L. 
LOGOS TECHNOLOGY S.R.L. 
STEP - S.R.L. 
ONE TEAM S.R.L. 
SYNC LAB S.R.L. 
XEFFE - S.R.L. 
TRUST-ITALIA S.P.A. 
IDC S.P.A. 
DATA NETWORK CONSULTING S.R.L. 
VETRYA S.P.A 
ATON S.P.A. 
SOLID WORLD SRL 
EPIPOLI SPA 
INTERSISTEMI ITALIA S.P.A. 
ADITINET CONSULTING SPA 
PRESENT S.P.A. 







SME UP S.P.A. 
DGS S.P.A. 
METODA - S.P.A. 
SPINDOX S.P.A. 
AURIGA S.P.A. 
SEA VISION S.R.L. 
PIC SERVIZI PER L'INFORMATICA S.R.L. 
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VISIBILIA EDITORE S.P.A. 
EDIZIONI FAG S.R.L. 
MATTIOLI 1885 S.R.L. 
TEP S.R.L. 
EDIZIONI STAR COMICS S.R.L. 
MACRO SOCIETA' COOPERATIVA IN FORMA ABBREVIATA MACRO SOC. COOP. 
CELDES - S.R.L. 
MEDIA S.R.L. 
SCRIPTA MANEANT S.R.L. 
EGAF EDIZIONI - S.R.L. 
ASTE GIUDIZIARIE INLINEA S.P.A. 
LE SCIENZE S.P.A. 
TNE S.R.L. 
EDIZIONI EL S.R.L. 
WM CAPITAL S.P.A. 
BUSINESS COMPETENCE S.R.L. 
FOCUS MANAGEMENT S.P.A. 
MG CONSULTING S.R.L 
RONCUCCI&PARTNERS S.R.L. 
COMPAGNIA DELLE IDEE SRL 
SERVIZI & SISTEMI S.R.L. 
ECONOMISTI ASSOCIATI S.R.L. 
INIZIATIVA CUBE S.R.L. 
PROGESA S.P.A. 
ARGO S.R.L. 
MACFIN - MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS - SOCIETA A RESPONSABILITA LIMITATA  
WMR S.R.L. 
GRUPPO IMPERIALI - NETWORK SERVICES S.R.L. 
EUROSEARCH CONSULTANTS - S.R.L. 
SO.GE.I. S.R.L. 
KLECHA & CO. S.R.L. 









Table 3.5: Ateco 2007 industry code – Legend 
ATECO 2007 General sector Specific sector Activity AIM company
110210 INDUSTRIA DELLE BEVANDE Produzione di vini da tavola e v.p.q.r.d. MASI AGRICOLA S.P.A.
141000
CONFEZIONE DI ARTICOLI DI ABBIGLIAMENTO; CONFEZIONE DI 
ARTICOLI IN PELLE E PELLICCIA
Confezione di articoli di abbigliamento (escluso abbigliamento in pelliccia) COVER 50 S.P.A.
257320
FABBRICAZIONE DI PRODOTTI IN METALLO (ESCLUSI MACCHINARI E 
ATTREZZATURE)
Fabbricazione di stampi, portastampi, sagome, forme per macchine COSTAMP GROUP S.P.A.
261100
FABBRICAZIONE DI COMPUTER E PRODOTTI DI ELETTRONICA E 
OTTICA; APPARECCHI ELETTROMEDICALI, APPARECCHI DI 
MISURAZIONE E DI OROLOGI
Fabbricazione di componenti elettronici ENERTRONICA SANTERNO S.P.A.
289999 FABBRICAZIONE DI MACCHINARI ED APPARECCHIATURE NCA Fabbricazione di altre macchine per impieghi speciali nca (incluse parti e accessori) SITI - B&T GROUP S.P.A.
309112 FABBRICAZIONE DI ALTRI MEZZI DI TRASPORTO Fabbricazione di motocicli ENERGICA MOTOR COMPANY S.P.A.
310122 FABBRICAZIONE DI MOBILI Fabbricazione di altri mobili non metallici per ufficio e negozi CLABO SOCIETA' PER AZIONI
321210 ALTRE INDUSTRIE MANIFATTURIERE
Fabbricazione di oggetti di gioielleria ed oreficeria in metalli preziosi o rivestiti di 
metalli preziosi
FOPE S.P.A.
329990 ALTRE INDUSTRIE MANIFATTURIERE Fabbricazione di altri articoli nca GIORGIO FEDON & FIGLI SPA
351100
FORNITURA DI ENERGIA ELETTRICA, GAS, VAPORE E ARIA 
CONDIZIONATA
Produzione di energia elettrica ECOSUNTEK S.P.A.
351400
FORNITURA DI ENERGIA ELETTRICA, GAS, VAPORE E ARIA 
CONDIZIONATA
Commercio di energia elettrica FINTEL ENERGIA GROUP S.P.A.
466920
COMMERCIO ALL'INGROSSO E AL DETTAGLIO; 
RIPARAZIONE DI AUTOVEICOLI E MOTOCICLI
COMMERCIO ALL'INGROSSO (ESCLUSO QUELLO DI AUTOVEICOLI E DI 
MOTOCICLI)
Commercio all'ingrosso di materiale elettrico per impianti di uso industriale GRUPPO GREEN POWER S.P.A. Utilities Secondary
581400 ATTIVITÀ EDITORIALI Edizione di riviste e periodici BLUE FINANCIAL COMMUNICATION S.P.A.
581400 ATTIVITÀ EDITORIALI Edizione di riviste e periodici VISIBILIA EDITORE S.P.A.
591100
ATTIVITÀ DI PRODUZIONE CINEMATOGRAFICA, DI VIDEO E DI 
PROGRAMMI TELEVISIVI, DI REGISTRAZIONI MUSICALI E SONORE
Attività di produzione cinematografica, di video e di programmi televisivi LEONE FILM GROUP S.P.A.
591100
ATTIVITÀ DI PRODUZIONE CINEMATOGRAFICA, DI VIDEO E DI 
PROGRAMMI TELEVISIVI, DI REGISTRAZIONI MUSICALI E SONORE
Attività di produzione cinematografica, di video e di programmi televisivi NOTORIOUS PICTURES SOCIETA' PER AZIONI
619099 TELECOMUNICAZIONI Altre attività connesse alle telecomunicazioni nca GO INTERNET S.P.A
620100
PRODUZIONE DI SOFTWARE, CONSULENZA INFORMATICA E ATTIVITÀ 
CONNESSE
Produzione di software non connesso all'edizione PRISMI S.P.A.
620100
PRODUZIONE DI SOFTWARE, CONSULENZA INFORMATICA E ATTIVITÀ 
CONNESSE
Produzione di software non connesso all'edizione EXPERT SYSTEM S.P.A.
620100
PRODUZIONE DI SOFTWARE, CONSULENZA INFORMATICA E ATTIVITÀ 
CONNESSE
Produzione di software non connesso all'edizione VETRYA S.P.A
620200
PRODUZIONE DI SOFTWARE, CONSULENZA INFORMATICA E ATTIVITÀ 
CONNESSE
Consulenza nel settore delle tecnologie dell'informatica H-FARM S.P.A.
620200
PRODUZIONE DI SOFTWARE, CONSULENZA INFORMATICA E ATTIVITÀ 
CONNESSE
Consulenza nel settore delle tecnologie dell'informatica SOFTEC S.P.A.
631130 ATTIVITÀ DEI SERVIZI D'INFORMAZIONE E ALTRI SERVIZI INFORMATICI Hosting e fornitura di servizi applicativi (ASP) MAILUP S.P.A.
662200 ATTIVITÀ FINANZIARIE E ASSICURATIVE
ATTIVITÀ AUSILIARIE DEI SERVIZI FINANZIARI E DELLE ATTIVITÀ 
ASSICURATIVE
Attività di agenti e mediatori di assicurazioni ASSITECA S.P.A. Financial services Tertiary
681000 ATTIVITÀ IMMOBILIARI ATTIVITÀ IMMOBILIARI Compravendita di beni immobili effettuata su beni propri IMVEST S.P.A. Real estate Tertiary
701000 ATTIVITÀ DI DIREZIONE AZIENDALE E DI CONSULENZA GESTIONALE Attività delle holding impegnate nelle attività gestionali (holding operative) INIZIATIVE BRESCIANE - INBRE - S.P.A.
702209 ATTIVITÀ DI DIREZIONE AZIENDALE E DI CONSULENZA GESTIONALE
Altre attività di consulenza imprenditoriale e altra consulenza amministrativo-
gestionale e pianificazione aziendale
DIGITAL MAGICS S.P.A.
702209 ATTIVITÀ DI DIREZIONE AZIENDALE E DI CONSULENZA GESTIONALE
Altre attività di consulenza imprenditoriale e altra consulenza amministrativo-
gestionale e pianificazione aziendale
WM CAPITAL S.P.A.
702209 ATTIVITÀ DI DIREZIONE AZIENDALE E DI CONSULENZA GESTIONALE
Altre attività di consulenza imprenditoriale e altra consulenza amministrativo-
gestionale e pianificazione aziendale
AMBROMOBILIARE S.P.A.
702209 ATTIVITÀ DI DIREZIONE AZIENDALE E DI CONSULENZA GESTIONALE
Altre attività di consulenza imprenditoriale e altra consulenza amministrativo-
gestionale e pianificazione aziendale
CDR ADVANCE CAPITAL S.P.A.
711220
ATTIVITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI ARCHITETTURA, INGEGNERIA ED ALTRI 
STUDI TECNICI
Servizi di progettazione di ingegneria integrata ROSETTI MARINO S.P.A.
731102 PUBBLICITÀ E RICERCHE DI MERCATO Conduzione di campagne di marketing e altri servizi pubblicitari DIGITOUCH S.P.A.
791100
NOLEGGIO, AGENZIE DI VIAGGIO, SERVIZI DI SUPPORTO 
ALLE IMPRESE
ATTIVITÀ DEI SERVIZI DELLE AGENZIE DI VIAGGIO, DEI TOUR 
OPERATOR E SERVIZI DI PRENOTAZIONE E ATTIVITÀ CONNESSE






FORNITURA DI ENERGIA ELETTRICA, GAS, VAPORE E 
ARIA CONDIZIONATA
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Figure 3.4a: Revenues (pre) 
 
 









































Figure 3.10: Distribution of revenues 
  
Figure 3.12: Distribution of assets 
 




Figure 3.17: Distribution of operating expenses 
 
Figure 3.19: Distribution of profit/loss 
 




Figure 3.26: Distribution of D/E 
 
Figure 3.28: Distribution of NFP/Ebitda 
 




Figure 3.32: Distribution of current ratio 
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